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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court by Utah Code
Ann., § 78-2a-3(2)(f), and by Rules 3 and 4, of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, and Rule 65, of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The

Petitioner

and Appellant, LARRY

JOE BOUDREAUX,

request this Honorable Court consider upon this appeal the issues
which follow:

1. Whether the Sixth Judicial District Court should have
summarily deprived the Petitioner of his right to present evidence?
Preserved at R. 144-146, 148; Tr. p.8 1. 6-7; p. 12, 1. 10-15;
p.l3,1.14-p.l4, 1.9;p.20, 1.14-19;p.21, 1.16-p.22, 1.25; p. 57,1.1p.60,1.25; p.75, 1.13-16; p.80, 1.12-13; p.82, 1.10-25.
2. Whether the Petitioner should have been permitted to
present evidence upon the unconstitutional restraint upon his
liberty and the denials of due process by the State of Kentucky and
the State of Utah?

Preserved at R.l-13, R. 48-76, R.144-146, 148;

Tr. p.8 1. 6-7; p. 12, 1. 10-15; p.13,1.14-p.14, 1.9;p.20, 1.1419;p.21, 1.16-p.22, 1.25; p. 57,1.1-p.60,1.25; p.75, 1.13-16; p.80,
1.12-13; p.82, 1.10-25.
3. Whether the Petitioner should have been permitted to
present

testimony

and

documentary

evidence

as

to

the prior

applications for habeas corpus by him and the action of the trial
court thereupon? R. 1-47, R. 48-77, R. 148, R. 122-126; R. 143,
148, Tr. p. 85, Tr. p. 100.
4.

Whether the Decree of Divorce entered in the Third

Judicial District Court for Tooele County is the controlling law of
the case? R.l-17, Tr. p. 115.
5.

Whether the laws of the State of Utah are the

applicable laws of this action, or whether the State of Kentucky is
without jurisdiction to extradite Mr. Boudreaux until the trial
court renders a decision under UIFSA? R. 238, Tr. p.115.
2

6.

Whether the collection of Mr. Boudreaux's child

support by the State of Utah, Office of Recovery Services, bars
extradition under UCEA? R. 238, Tr. p.110-130.
7.

Whether

the

warrant

and

supporting

documents

submitted by the State of Kentucky are defective? R. 1-13.
8.

Whether the State of Kentucky is bound by URESA and

UIFSA, and the Petition

it filed

for the collection

of Mr.

Boudreaux's child support obligation? Exhibit 3.
9.

Whether the assertion of false facts by officials of

the State of Kentucky, and the State of Utah deprives Mr. Boudreaux
of his right of due process? Tr. p. 78, 88.
10.

Whether the State of Kentucky's failure to properly

serve Mr. Boudreaux with a Summons and Indictment or Information
requiring his appearancee in it's court is a denial of his right of
due process? Tr. p. 84-88.
11.

Whether the State of Utah, Office of Recovery

Services has been successful in the collection of child support? R.
1-13, 24, 45, 65-66; Exh. 3, Exh. 4; Tr. pp. 108-119.
12. Whether the two (2), prior grants of writs of habeas
corpus are res judicata in this proceeding? R. 9,147, Tr.pp. 89-96,
119-120.
13.

Whether the restraint upon Mr. Boudreaux's liberty

is unlawful? R.12.

3

14.

Whether the prior dismissals with prejudice of the

criminal informations and grants of the two (2), prior writs of
habeas corpus based upon identical facts bars subsequent attempts
by the State of Kentucky to extradite Mr. Boudreaux? R. 1-47, Tr.
pp.89-96, 98.
15.

Whether Mr. Boudreaux is entitled to release from

incarceration or release upon bail? R. 12; R.238, Tr. pp.22-38.
16.

Whether the affidavit of Joel C. Rich, and other

documents from the State of Kentucky are defective in that they are
not based upon his personal

knowledge, are not supported by

adequate documentation, have not been authenticated nor made before
a

magistrate,

not

duly

certified

and/or

contain

false

and

misleading facts? R. 7-9.
17.

Is the Warrant of the Govenor of the State of Utah

defective and deficient upon it's face, and void? R. 1-13, R. 1-47,
Tr. pp. 87-89.
18.

Did the trial court abuse it's discretion by

ordering Mr. Boudreaux extradited to the State of Kentucky to stand
trial upon a felony criminal charge? R. 182-186, 237.
19.

Is the restraint against Mr. Boudreaux's liberty

unlawful and illegal, defective and deficient factually and upon
it's face and therefore void as a matter of law? R.l-46.
20.

Should Mr. Boudreaux's Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus be summarily denied? R.131-148.
4

21.

Should

Mr.

Boudreaux

be

permitted

to

present

evidence? R.131-148.
22.

Did URESA, and does UIFSA, govern and provide the

rights and duties of the demanding state, Kentucky, the asylum
state, Utah, and the Petitioner, Mr. Boudreaux? R.131-148.
23.

Whether Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-45f-801,

applies to this proceeding and how does the UIFSA statute apply?
R.131-148.
24.

Should Mr. Boudreaux be permitted

to present

evidence and defenses pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 7845f-207, 209, 301, 303, 305, 316, 318, 401, 506, 604, 606, 607,
613, and 614? R. 131-148.
25.

Is the Utah

statute

of

limitations

upon the

collection of child support applicable to the proceeding and how is
the statute applicable? R. 131-148.
26.

Do Utah Code Annotated, Sections 78-45f-207, and

604, provide that the laws of the State of Utah control and govern
the nature, extent, amount, and duration of the current payments
and other obligations of support and the payment of arrearages
under the child support order? R. 131-149.
27.

Did the former Sections 77-31-20, through 27, and

UIFSA Sections 78-45f-207, 209, 301, 303, 305, 316, 318, 401, 604,
606, 607, and 614 provide the authority, powers and duties of the
trial court in this action and what is the trial court entitled to
5

find? R. 131-149.
28.

Are the traditional

inquiries of the Emig v.

Hayward, precedent expanded when an extradition action is based
upon a UIFSA proceeding? R. 131-149.
29.

Is

the

presentation

by

the

Petitioner, Mr.

Boudreaux, of evidence and affirmative defenses inconsistent with
UCEA, and should the presentation of evidence and defenses be
permitted under UIFSA and UCEA? R. 131-149.
30.

Are Mr. Boudreauxf the State of Utah and the State

of Kentucky bound by the provisions of the order of the United
States Bankruptcy Court? Tr. p. 86, Exh. 1, 2(Proof of Claim);
31.

Must the State of Utah and the State of Kentucky

comply with the provisions of UCEA and UIFSA? R. 1-47.
32.

Have the notice, due process

and

evidentiary

requirements of UCEA and UIFSA been met? R. 1-46, 131-149.
33.

Should Mr. Boudreaux be awarded his damages, costs

and attorney fees? R. 1-46.
34.

Should the trial court have made findings of fact

and conclusions of law upon Mr. Boudreaux7s Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus? R. 156-174, 156.
35.

Should the trial court have made findings of fact

and conclusions of law upon UIFSA, Utah Code Annotated, Sections
78-45f-101,et seq.? R. 156-174, 156.
36.

Should the trial court have made findings of fact
6

and conclusions of law upon Mr. Boudreaux's request for release
from incarceration, or release upon bail? R. 156-174, 156.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review governing the determination of
each of the issues presented upon this appeal, because there are no
factual disputes and because no particular deference is given to
the trial court's rulings on questions of law, is the correction of
error standaard.

Shaw v. Layton Constr. Co., 872 P.2d 1059, 1061

(Utah App. 1994); Broadwater v. Old Republic Sur., 854 P.2d 527,
534 n.3 (Utah 1993); Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202, 203 (Utah
App. 1991); Gramlich v. Munsey, 838 P.2d 1131, 1132 (Utah 1992); In
re Schwenke, 865 P.2d 1350, 1354 (Utah 1993); Jacobsen Inv. Co. v.
State Tax Comm'n, 839 P.2d 789, 790 (Utah 1992); State v. Deli, 861
P2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993); State v. Waite, 803 P.2d 1279, 1282 (Utah
App. 1990) .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On the 14th day of April, 1982, the Third Judicial
District Court for Tooele County, within the State of Utah entered
it's Decree of Divorce dissolving the marriage to his then wife,
Melanie Lynn Boudreaux.

Paragraph three(3), of the Decree of

Divorce ordered Larry Joe Boudreaux to pay child support in the
amount of Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00), per month for hi minor
child, Jo Lynn Boudreaux. R. 2.
The

Defendant

in

the
7

divorce

case,

Melanie

Lynn

Boudreaux, then took the minor child, Jo Lynn, and moved to the
State of Kentucky.

In January of 1998, Jo Lynn reached the age of

eighteen (18), years. R. 3.
Mr. Boudreaux's child support payment to Melanie Lynn
Boudreaux is being and has been collected by the State of Utah,
Office of Recovery Services.

Admitted into evidence were the

Office of Recovery Services for the State of Utah record of
collection and payment of child support by Mr. Boudreaux. R. 3.
On the 3rd day of November, 1993, the State of Utah upon
the request of the State of Kentucky filed a criminal Information
against Mr. Boudreaux alleging that he should be extradited and was
a fugitive from justice from Kentucky where he was charged with
flagrant non-support, case number 931600149. R. 4.
Mr. Boudreaux was then arrested by the Sheriff of the
County of Sanpete within the State of Utah and restrained of his
liberty under the authority of and upon said warrant of the State
of Kentucky and he was released upon an Undertaking of Bail. R. 5.
On the 2nd day of February, 1994, Mr. Boudreaux filed in
the Sixth Judicial District Court for Sanpete County his Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus asserting an unlawful restraint upon his
liberty. R. 5.
On the 4th day of March, 1994, the Sixth Judicial
District Court entered it's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
which were excepted into evidence.
8

In paragraphs one (1), through

(9), the Court finds that Mr. Boudreaux did not flee the State of
Kentucky, that he was and is not a fugitive from justice, that the
affidavits supporting the extradition request from Kentucky are
false and not true and that child support is being successfully
collected by the State of Utah, Office of Recovery Services under
the Uniform Recoprical Enforcement of Support Act (URESA.) R. 5.
On the 4th day of March, 1994, the Sixth Judicial
District Court entered it's Order Upon the Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus. A copy of the Order bearing the Court's filing stamp
was

excepted

into

evidence.

The

trial

Court

granted

Mr.

Boudreaux's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and denied and
quashed the Governor's Warrant.

The Court ordered that the

Information filed by the State of Utah alleging that he was a
fugutive from justice was dismissed with prejudice.

This decision

was not appealed by the State of Utah nor the State of Kentucky and
is binding thereupon. R.5-6.
On the 1st day of March, 1994, the State of Utah upon the
request for extradition of the State of Kentucky filed a second
criminal Information against Mr. Boudreaux in the Sixth Judicial
District Court alleging again that he was a fugutive from justice
standing

charged

with

Flagrant

Non-Support

in

the

State of

Kentucky, case number 941600173. R. 6.
Mr. Boudreaux again filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus and a hearing was held thereupon on the 16th day of
9

November, 1994. On the 6th day of March, 1995, the Sixth Judicial
District Court entered it's Order Upon Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus

granting

quashing,

Mr.

denying

Boudreaux's

and

petition

dismissing

with

a

second

prejudice

time
the

and
1994

Information and Governor's Warrant requested by the State of
Kentucky and the State of Utah.

The Court, at paragraph five (5),

incorporated it's prior Findings of Fact that the affidavits upon
which the Kentucky request was based are false and not true. The
Court, at paragraph six (6), of the order reserved the amount of
his damages, costs and attorney fees incurred by him in the
extradition proceedings.

The State of Kentucky nor the State of

Utah appealed the Findings of Fact and Order and they are binding
thereupon. R. 6-7.
On the 5th day of June, 1996, an Indictment, No. 96-CI00016, was again filed against Mr. Boudreaux a third time in
Webster County within the State of Kentucky again charging him with
Flagrant Non-Support, a Class D Felony.

The Warrant of Arrest of

the Webster County Circuit Court asserts that Mr. Boudreaux is a
fugutive from justice.

Mr. Boudreaux was not notified of the

proceeding before the grand jury and was denied his right of due
process thereby.

The Warrant of Arrest indicates upon it's face

that it is not bailable and thus the assumption that Mr. Boudreaux
will be permitted bail in the State of Kentucky is rebutted, and
denies Mr. Boudreaux of his right to bail. R. 7, 162.
10

On the 29th day of September, 1998, Mr. Boudeaux filed
his third, and present, Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
and the State did not file an answer to his petition. R.l-46.
On October 30, 1998, the time set for trial of the
Petition the trial court

summarily dismissed Mr. Boudreaux's

petition and refused to permit him to present evidence upon his
assertions of the petition and the unconstutional restraint upon
his liberty, and upon his UIFSA defenses.

The Findings of Fact,

Conclusions of Law and Order were signed by the trial court on
November 25, 1998.
On November 25, 1998, the Petitioner, Mr. Boudreaux filed
his Notice of Appeal in the Sixth Judicial District Court.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
a.

Larry Joe Boudreaux, the Petitioner, is a resident

of the County of Sanpete within the State of Utah.

He is competent

to testify if so called, and the facts which he stated in his
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus are based upon his knowledge and
personal observations. R. 2.
b.

Larry Joe Boudreaux was born on the 13th day of

February, 1960, in Tooele County, Utah, and has since remained a
permanent resident of the State of Utah.

His residence address is

87 West 600 South, in the City of Mount Pleasant in Sanpete County
within the State of Utah. R. 2.
c.

Mr. Boudreaux has four (4), minor children who are
11

in his sole care, custody and control pursuant to an order of the
Honorable Louis G. Tervort, of the Sixth Judicial District Court,
a wife, Tammy, and two (2), stepchildren and all of whom rely soley
upon him for their support, shelter, food and all of the other
necessities of life. R. 2.
d.

On the 14th day of April, 1982, the Third Judicial

District Court for Tooele County, within the State of Utah entered
it's Decree of Divorce dissolving the marriage to his then wife,
Melanie Lynn Boudreaux.

Paragraph three(3), of the Decree of

Divorce ordered Larry Joe Boudreaux to pay child support in the
amount of Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00), per month for his minor
child, Jo Lynn Boudreaux. R. 2.
e.

The Defendant in the divorce case, Melanie Lynn

Boudreaux, then took the minor child, Jo Lynn, and moved to the
State of Kentucky.

In January of 1998, Jo Lynn reached the age of

eighteen (18), years. R. 3.
f. Mr. Boudreaux's child support payment to Melanie Lynn
Boudreaux is being and has been collected by the State of Utah,
Office of Recovery Services.

Excepted into evidence were the

Office of Recovery Services for the State of Utah record of
collection and payment of child support by Mr. Boudreaux. R. 3.
g.

An Indictment in case number 9-CR-022, was issued

against Mr. Boudreaux by a grand jury in the Webster County Circuit
Court for the Commonwealth of Kentucky on the 14th day of October,
12

1993, charging that he committed the crime of Flagrant Non-Support,
a class D felony in violation of Kentucky Revised Statutes 530.050.
Mr. Boudreaux first received and read this Indictiment on the 1st
day of February, 1994.
h.

R. 3.

Mr. Boudreaux was not afforded the opportunity of a

hearing nor was he permitted to present evidence before the grand
jury in the Webster County Circuit Court and as a result thereof he
has been denied the right to due process of law afforded him by the
Constitution of the United States of America, the Commonwealth of
Kentucky and the State of Utah. R. 3-4.
i.

On the 3rd day of November, 1993, the State of Utah

upon the request

of the State of Kentucky

filed a criminal

Information against Mr. Boudreaux alleging that he was a fugitive
from justice from Kentucky where he was charged with flagrant nonsupport, case number 931600149. R. 4.
j.

On the 17th day of December, 1993, Michael 0.

Leavitt, the Governor of the State of Utah, issued an extradition
Warrant which required the arrest of Mr. Boudreaux. R. 4.
k.

Mr. Boudreaux was arrested by the Sheriff of the

County of Sanpete within the State of Utah and restrained of his
liberty under the authority of said warrant of the State of
Kentucky and he was released upon an Undertaking of Bail. R. 5.
1. On the 2nd day of February, 1994, Mr. Boudreaux filed
in the Sixth Judicial District Court
13

for Sanpete County his

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus asserting an unlawful restraint
upon his liberty. R. 5.
m.

On the 4th day of March, 1994, the Sixth Judicial

District Court entered it's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
which were excepted into evidence.

In paragraphs one (1), through

(9), the Court finds that Mr. Boudreaux did not flee the State of
Kentucky, that he was and is not a fugitive from justice, that the
affidavits supporting the extradition request from Kentucky are
false and not true and that child support is being successfully
collected by the State of Utah, Office of Recovery Services under
the Uniform Recoprical Enforcement of Support Act (URESA.) R. 5.
n.

On the 4th day of March, 1994, the Sixth Judicial

District Court entered it's Order Upon the Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus. A copy of the Order bearing the Court's filing stamp
was

admitted

into

evidence.

The

trial

Court

granted

Mr.

Boudreaux's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and denied and
quashed the Governor's Warrant.

The Court ordered that the

Information filed by the State of Utah alleging that he was a
fugutive from justice was dismissed with prejudice.

This decision

was not appealed by the State of Utah nor the State of Kentucky and
is binding thereupon. R.5-6.
o. On the 1st day of March, 1994, the State of Utah upon
the request of the State of Kentucky filed a second criminal
Information against Mr. Boudreaux in the Sixth Judicial District
14

Court alleging again that he was a fugutive from justice standing
charged with Flagrant Non-Support in the State of Kentucky, case
number 941600173. R. 6.
p.

Mr. Boudreaux again filed his Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus and a hearing was held thereupon on the 16th day of
November, 1994. On the 6th day of March, 1995, the Sixth Judicial
District Court entered it's Order Upon Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus

granting

quashing,

Mr. Boudreaux's

denying

and

petition

dismissing

with

a

second

prejudice

time
the

and
1994

Information and Governor's Warrant requested by the State of
Kentucky and the State of Utah.

The Court, at paragraph five (5),

incorporated it's prior Findings of Fact that the affidavits upon
which the Kentucky request was based are false and not true. The
Court, at paragraph six (6), of the order reserved the amount of
his damages, costs and attorney fees incurred by him in the
extradition proceedings.

The State of Kentucky nor the State of

Utah appealed the Findings of Fact and Order and they are binding
thereupon. R. 6-7.
q.

On the 5th day of June, 1996, an Indictment, No. 96-

CI-00016, was again filed against Mr. Boudreaux a third time in
Webster County within the State of Kentucky again charging him with
Flagrant Non-Support, a Class D Felony.

The Warrant of Arrest of

the Webster County Circuit Court asserts that Mr. Boudreaux is a
fugutive from justice.

Mr. Boudreaux was not notified of the
15

proceeding before the grand jury and was denied his right of due
process thereby.

The Warrant of Arrest indicates upon itfs face

that it is not bailable and thus the assumption that Mr. Boudreaux
will be permitted bail in the State of Kentucky is rebutted, and
denies Mr. Boudreaux of his right to bail. R. 7, 162.
r. The request for extradition by the State of Kentucky,
the

Indictment

and

Warrant

of

Arrest

are

based

upon

tne

Supplelmental Affidavit of Prosecuting Attorney, Joel C. Rich.
This affidavit is false and the facts stated therein are not true
and this Honorable Court has entered it's Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law finding that said facts are false in two (2),
prior habeas corpus proceedings, referred to above.

The affidavit

is not based upon the personal knowledge and observations of the
affiant and contain hearsay, conclusory statements. The assertions
are not support by copies of the documents to which the assertions
refer as required by the Rules of Evidence.

The affidavit has not

been authenticated by the Governor nor was the affidavit made
before a magistrate as required by Utah Code Section 77-30-3. R. 78.
s.

This is the third application for a writ of habeas

corpus and two (2), prior applications for such a writ for the
relief herein sought have been before made to and granted, quashing
and dismissing with prejudice the two (2), prior Informations,
Warrants of Arrest and requests for extradition by the State of
16

Kentucky

upon

identical

facts.

This present

application to

extradite Mr, Boudreaux is barred by the doctrines of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, the law of the case, and violation of his
constitutional rights of due process by the State of Utah and the
State of Kentucky. R. 9.
t.

The warrant of the Governor of the State of Utah is

defective and deficient upon it's face, and void, in that it states
that Mr. Boudreaux has taken refuge in the State of Utah. R. 1-13.
u.

Mr. Boudreaux has never resided in nor has he ever

been, even momentarily, in the State of Kentucky other than to get
married to Melanie on the 6th day of July, 1979.

Since 1979, he

has not resided in, visited or at any time entered within the
jurisdictional
Boudreaux

limits

is not

of the

taking

State

refuge

of Kentucky.

in Utah

Thus, Mr.

as asserted

in the

governor's warrant, rendering it defective upon it's face. R. 9-10.
v.

Mr. Boudreaux has never been a fugitive nor has he

fled from the justice of the State of Kentucky and taken refuge
within the State of Utah which is falsly asserted in the Governor's
Warrant. R.10.
w.

The warrant of the Governor of the State of Utah is

deffective and deficient upon it's face, and void, in that the
affidavit and other supporting documents are not authenticated as
asserted in the warrant.
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x. Mr. Boudreaux was not afforded the opportunity for a
hearing nor to present evidence to the grand jury and thus he was
denied his right of due process afforded him under the Constitution
of the United States of America, the Constitution of the State of
Utah and the Constitution of the State of Kentucky.

He was not

served with the Indictment nor any summons requiring his appearance
at an arraignment in Kentucky.

The present restraint upon his

liberty by his incarceration in the Sanpete County Jail and the
warrants of the State of Kentucky is a denial of his right of due
process.
y.

Mr. Boudreaux's child support obligation is being

collected successfully by the Office of Recovery Services for the
State of Utah pursuant to U.C.A. Sections 77-31-1 et seq., as shown
by the records of Recovery Services. R. 11-12. Addendum A-E.
z.

Mr. Boudreaux respectfully requested the trial Court

discharge him from custody and repair and restore to him his
liberty which has been unlawfully restrained by granting his
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and awarding Mr. Boudreaux his
damages, costs and attorney fees. R. 12.
aa.

The State of Utah sought to deprive the Petitioner

of a hearing upon his Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus and have
the trial Court deny his petition summarily and transport him to
the State of Kentucky to stand trial upon a crime of failure to pay
his child support.

The State of Utah also sought, by it's Motion
18

in Limine, to prevent the Petitioner from introducing his evidence.
R, 52-62,
bb.

The trial court granted the Motion in Limine and

summarily denied the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus refusing
Larry Joe Boudreaux his right to present evidence upon his petition
for writ of habeas corpus and pursuant to UIFSA. R. 238, Tr. p. 98.
cc.

On the 4th day of March, 1994, the Court ruled that

the Petitioner's child support was being collected by the State of
Utah through their URESA actions now pending.

URESA has been

repealed and the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) ,
Sections 78-45f-100, et seq. was enacted in it's place. R. 1-46.
dd.
Uniform

Utah Code Annotated, Sections 77-31-1 et seq., the

Reciprocal

Enforcement

of Support Act, governed

and

provided the rights and duties of the demanding state, Kentucky,
the asylum state, Utah, and the Petitioner, Mr. Boudreaux at the
time.

The replacement statute, UIFSA, now provides the rights and

duties of the demanding state, Kentucky, the asylum state, Utah,
and the Petitioner, Mr. Boudreaux.

UIFSA also provides the

authority, powers and duties of the trial court in this proceeding
as did the predecessor statute. R.131-149.
ee. At the time, U.C.A. Section 77-31-5, provided that,
"the provisions for extradition of criminals not inconsistent
herewith shall apply to any such demand although the person whose
surrender is demanded was not in the demanding state at the time of
19

the

commission

of

the

crime

and

although

he

had

not

fled

therefrom." R.131-149.
ff. Like URESA, UIFSA provides at Section 78-45f-801(3),
that,

xx

(3)

A

provision

for

extradition

of

individuals

not

inconsistent with this chapter applies to the demand even if the
individual whose surrrender is demanded was not in the demanding
state when the crime was allegedly committed and has not fled
therefrom."

The provisions for extradition of the Petitionee

Sections 77-30-1, et seq., apply when they are not inconsistent
with UIFSA.

Thus, the Petitioner, Mr. Boudreaux, pursuant to

UIFSA, Sections 78-45f-207, 78-45f-209, 78-45f-301, 78-45f-303, 784 5f-305, 7 8-4 5f-316, 78-4 5f-318, 7 8-45f-4 01, 7 8-4 5f-506, 7 8-4 5f604, 78-45f-606 and 607, and 78-45f-613 and 614, is permitted to
present evidence and defenses to this Honorable Court.R. 131-149.
gg. The former U.C.A. Section 77-31-7, provided that the
duties of support of the Petitioner are those of the State of Utah
because Mr. Boudreaux was present in Utah during the period for
which support is sought. Similarly, UIFSA, at Sections 78-45f-207,
and 604, provide that the laws of the State of Utah control and
govern the nature, extent, amount, and duration of the current
payments and other obligations of support and the payment of
arrearages under the order.

In Utah the statute of limitations for

child support arrearages is eight (8), years, under U.C.A. Section
78-12-22. R. 131-149.
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hh.

The former, LLC.A, Section 77-31-20, provided that,

"The Court shall conduct proceeding under this act in the manner
prescribed by law for an action for the enforcement of the type of
duty of support claimed. R. 131-149.
ii.

The former U.C.A. Sections 77-31-20, through 77-31-

27, provide for the powers and duties of this Honorable Court in
determining support. Again similarly, UIFSA, sections 78-45f-207,
209, 301, 303, 305, 316, 318, 401, 604, 606, 607, and 614, provides
the authority, powers and duties of the District Court in this
proceeding.

The Court is entitled to find the amount Mr. Boudreaux

owes in child support, order payment and take other actions to
insure the payment of child support including, but not limited to,
staying this proceeding. R. 131-149.
jj.

The claim of the State of Utah that the Petitioner

is not permitted to present evidence is wrong because the UCEA
applies only when it is not inconsistent with UIFSA.
the presentation

of evidence

and affirmative

UIFSA permits

defenses.

The

Petitioner's sworn statements and attachments to his petition, and
the prior Orders and Findings of Fact of the Court, all attached to
the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, show that the State of
Utah,

Office

of

Recovery

Services,

has

been

successful

in

collecting child support from the Petitioner. R. 131-149.
kk.

The State of Kentucky and the State of Utah have

made two (2), prior requests for extradition of the Petitioner,
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both of which have been denied by this Court. The facts before the
District Court are identical as those in the two

(2), prior

extradition requests, except that the Petitioner has continued to
pay his child support regularly since the state's prior attempts to
extradite him.
have been

Two (2), prior petitions for writ of Habeas Corpus

granted

the Petitioner, Mr. Boudreaux, based upon

identical facts and law asserted by all parties to this action.
Habeas Corpus is a civil remedy and because this Court has ruled
heretofor on the state's requests for extradition the issues are
res judicata.

This matter has been dismissed with prejudice on two

(2), prior occasions as shown by the two (2), Orders and Findings
of this Court. The affidavit filed in this case in support of the
extradition of the petitioner by the representative of the State of
Kentucky contains facts identical to those asserted by Kentucky in
the two

(2), prior proceedings.

The trial Court should have

granted the petition based upon URCP 65B(c)(5), because there have
been two (2), prior rulings on the legality of this restraint of
the

Petitioner's

liberty.

The doctrine

applicable to habeas corpus proceedings.

of

res judicate

is

The burden is upon the

State of Utah and the State of Kentucky to show that their
extradition falls outside of the doctrine of res judicata.

The

petition of Mr. Boudreaux should have been granted summarily. R. 146; R. 131-149.
11. Mr. Boudreaux has paid and the State of Utah, Office
22

of Recovery Services, under URESA and UIFSA, have successfully
collected the child support for the child of Mr. Boudreaux who was
eighteen (18), years old in January, 1998.

This is shown by the

records of the Office of Recovery Services which are attached to
his petition.

Any arrearage is being paid under the jurisdiction

of the United States Bankruptcy Court.

The Order of the United

States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah was admitted into
evidence. Mr. Boudreaux cannot pay monies outside of the confines
of payment ordered in the Bankruptcy Court Order. R. 1-46, 131-149.
mm.

The State of Kentucky and the State of Utah must

comply with the requirements of both UIFSA and UCEA.
failed to do so.

Mr. Boudreaux has had no notice of enforcement

action against him pursuant to UIFSA.
requirements

They have

The notice and evidentary

of neither UIFSA nor UCEA have been met.

The

extradition documents submitted by the State of Utah and the State
of Kentucky are facially defective and the facts asserted therein
are false, as asserted in the Statement of Facts above.R. 131-149.
nn.

On September 29, 1998, Mr. Boudreaux filed his

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

The State of Utah and the

State of Kentucky have failed to timely file an answer to the sworn
petition of Mr. Boudreaux.

The Petitioner requested that the

State's default be entered and that his petition be granted. URCP
65B(c)(6). R.131-149.
oo.

Otherwise, the Petitioner requests that he be
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permitted to present evidence upon the allegations of his petition,
that his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be granted and that the
extradition be quashed and again denied with prejudice. R. 1-13.
pp.

The Petitioner, Larry Joe Boudreaux, respectfully

requested that he be awarded his damages, costs and attorney fees
incurred in this action which is meritless and pursued in bad
faith. R. 1-13.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The State of Utah, in the trial court, sought to deprive
the Petitioner of a hearing and the presentation of evidence upon
his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and have the trial court
deny his petition summarily and transport him to the State of
Kentucky to stand trial upon a crime of failure to pay his child
support.

The trial court granted the State of Utah's motion to

dismiss the petition without permitting Mr. Boudreaux to present
evidence, testimonial and documentary, upon the allegations of his
petition wherein he asserted that he was denied due process of law.
Mr. Boudreaux should have been permitted to present evidence upon
but was not permitted to present evidence that he was not served
with nor provided notice of any arraignment in Kentucky, that the
affidavits of Joel Rich and Thomas Simpson in support of the
rendition were false, and that he had not "'taken refuge in the
State of Utah," as asserted in the Warrant of the Governor of the
State of Utah. Mr. Boudreaux should have been permitted to present
24

evidence upon but was not permitted by the trial court to present
evidence upon the two (2), prior attempts to extradite him by the
State of Kentucky upon identical claims and the granting by the
trial court of his two (2), prior habeas corpus petitions which
blocked both of Kentucky's attempts at extradition.
UIFSA provides at Section 78-45f-801(3) , that, "(3) A
provision for the extradition of individuals not inconsistent with
this chapter applies to the demand even if the individual whose
surrender is demanded was not in the demanding state when the crime
was

allegedly

committed

and

has

not

fled

therefrom."

The

provisions for extradition of the Petitioner, U.C.A. Sections 7730-1 et seq., apply when they are not inconsistent with UIFSA.
Thus, the Petitioner, Mr. Boudreaux, pursuant to UIFSA, Sections
78-45f-207, 78-45f-209, 78-45f-301, 78-45f-303, 78-45f-305, 78-45f316, 7 8-45f-318, 78-4 5f-4 01, 7 8-4 5f-506, 7 8-4 5f-604, 78-45f-606,
78-45f-607, and 78-45f-613 and 78-45f-614, is permitted to present
evidence and defenses to the trial court.
UIFSA, at Sections 78-45f-207, and 604, provide that the
laws of the State of Utah control the proceeding and govern the
nature, extent, amount, and duration of the current payments and
other obligations of support and the payment arrearages under the
Utah divorce decree. In Utah the statute of limitations for child
support arrearages is eight (8), years, under U.C.A. Section 78-1222. Seelev v. Park, 532 P.2d 684 (Utah 1975).
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The order of the trial court summarily dismissing Mr.
Boudreaux's Verified

Petition

for Writ

of Habeas Corpus and

prohibiting him from presenting his documentary and testimonial
evidence must be reversed.

The failure of the trial court to

permit the Petitioner to present evidence of the denials of his
rights of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, and the other
UIFSA evidence he proffered, is itself a denial of Mr. Boudreaux's
right of due process.

Alternatively, the appellate court should

instruct the trial court to make findings of fact based upon the
evidence profferred by Mr. Boudreaux and his witnesses inasmuch as
the State of Utah did not present any evidence in the proceeding,
or at trial, whatsoever.
The State of Kentucky and the State of Utah have made two
(2), prior attempts to extradite the Petitioner, Mr. Boudreaux,
both of which were denied by the trial court. R. 5-9, 18-22, 23-25,
26-27, 28-30.

The facts before the trial court upon the present,

and third, attempt to extradite the Petitioner are identical as
those in the two (2), prior extradition requests by the State of
Kentucky and the State of Utah, except that the Petitioner has
continued to pay his child support regularly since the prior
attempts to extradite him. R. 7-9.

Two (2), prior petitions for

Writ of Habeas Corpus have been granted the Petitioner, Mr.
Boudreaux, based upon identical facts and law asserted by all
parties to this action.

Habeas Corpus is a civil remedy and
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because the trial court had ruled heretofor on the state's requests
for extradition the issues are res judicata.

The matter had been

dismissed with prejudice on two (2), prior occasions as shown by
the two (2), Orders and Findings of the trial court. R. 5-9, 18-22,
23-25, 26-27, 28-30.

The State of Kentucky nor the State of Utah

presented any evidence whatsoever in the proceeding regarding Mr.
Boudreaux's res judicata defense.

Tr. 89-98.

The trial court

took judicial notice of and in case numbers 931600149, 940600581,
and 940600636, ruled that the restraint upon the liberty of Mr.
Boudreaux was illegal and violated his constitutional right of due
process.

Tr. p. 119-123. The two prior grants of habeas corpus to

Mr. Boudreaux upon the basis of false facts stated in affidavits of
Thomas Simpson, his filing of an affidavit in support of the
present attempt at extradition, and the prior rulings of the trial
court that the State of Utah, Office of Recovery Services has been
successfully collecting child support from Mr. Boudreaux, entitle
Mr. Boudreaux to assert the defense of res judicata, and to present
evidence and affirmative defenses.

The Petition of Mr. Boudreaux

should have been granted summarily given that the State of Utah and
the State of Kentucky failed to file an answer to the petition and
failed to present any evidence whatsoever controverting the sworn
assertions of Mr. Boudreaux, his documentary evidence and his
witnesses (which were proffered and excepted into evidence by the
trial court for the purpose of appeal. Tr. pp. 119-123.)
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Mr. Boudreaux has paid and the State of Utah, Office of
Recovery Services have successfully collected the Utah ordered
child support for the child of Mr. Boudreaux who was eighteen (18),
years old in January, 1998.

This is shown by the records of the

Office of Recovery

Services which are attached to his sworn

petition. R. 31-38.

It is also proved by the records of the State

of Utah, Office of Recovery Services that were excepted and
proffered into evidence at the hearing. Exhibit 4, and Exhibit 2.
The State presented no documents, proffered no witnesses and
presented no evidence conrotverting Mr. Boudreaux's assertion of
successful collection of child support.
Payments toward the child support

arrearage by Mr.

Boudreaux ceased in March, 1998, until October, 1998, when the
Office of Recovery Services received a payment $519.26, from the
United States Bankruptcy Court Trustee in Mr. Boudreaux's Chapter
13, case pursuant to the proof of claim of Recovery Services for
arrearages. Exhibit 1; Exhibit 2, Proof of Claim; Exhibit 4, p.l,
payment for October, 1998.

The Chapter 13 plan of Mr. Boudreaux

and the Order of the United States Bankruptcy Court provides that
the child support arrears will be paid in full by Mr. Boudreaux and
the United States Trustee.
Moreover,

Kentucky

has

no

jurisdiction

over

the

collection of child support arrearages, criminal or civil, ordered
by a Utah Decree of Divorce and collected by the State of Utah,
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Office of Recovery Services.

The district courts of Utah have

exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over the collection of past
due child support. State v. Child Support Enforcement, 888 P.2d
960, 963 (Utah App. 1993).
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States of America provides, "No person shall be... deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law..."
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States of America provides, "...nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law..."
Mr.

Boudreaux

asserted

in

his

sworn

petition

the

unconsitiutional restraint upon his liberty by his arrest and
incarceration in the Sanpete County Jail by the rendition request
of the State of Kentucky and the actions of the State of Utah. R.
3-13.
He

was

not

notified

of

any

proceedings against him. R. 1-13, R. 184.

Kentucky

grand

jury

He was not notified on

any arraignment proceeding in Kentucky enabling him to appear
before the Kentucky court. R. 1-13, R. 184, R. 111-125, R. 121.
The warrant of the Governor of the State of Utah refers to Mr.
Boudreaux as having taken refuge in Utah presumably in order to
avoid prosecution of a crime in Kentucky.

The statement is false.

Mr. Boudreaux has always resided and been domociled in the State of
29

Utah. R. 1-13. The State of Utah nor the State of Kentucky
presented controverting evidence that Mr. Boudreaux was notified of
an arraignment, or grand jury proceedings nor that Mr. Boudreaux
had taken refuge in the State of Utah.
The failure by the State of Kentucky to notify Mr.
Boudreaux of an arraignment proceeding, and the issuance of a no
bail warrant for his arrest based upon his failure to appear and
the arraignment, and his arrest upon such a warrant, is a violation
of his rights of due process guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment and
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of
America.

Mr. Boudreaux was arrested in Sanpete County on August

24, 1998, and today remains deprived of his liberty in the Sanpete
County Jail.
The affidavits of Mr. Thomas Simpson and Mr. Joel Rich
which state false facts. R. 1-46.

When there is fraud, falsity,

bad faith, clear default, or abuse in the performance of a duty a
court

should

interfere

in the manner

in which

an

executive

authority performs it's duties prescribed by law. Cope v. Toronto,
332 P.2d 977 (Utah 1958).
On December 7, 1998, Mr. Boudreaux requested that the
trial court release him from incarceration in the Sanpete County
Jail, or otherwise admit him to bail. R. 238, Tr. pp. 21-41.

The

trial court denied Mr. Boudreaux's release from incarceration and
denied his request for bail. R.238, Tr. pp. 39-41.
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ARGUMENT
THE PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE
UPON HIS PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND UIFSA
The State of Utah, in the trial court, sought to deprive
the Petitioner of a hearing and the presentation of evidence upon
his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and have the trial court
deny his petition summarily and transport him to the State of
Kentucky to stand trial upon a crime of failure to pay his child
support.

The trial court granted the State of Utah's motion to

dismiss the petition without permitting Mr. Boudreaux to present
evidence, testimony and documentary, upon the allegations of his
petition wherein he asserted that he was denied due process of law.
Mr. Boudreaux should have been permitted to present evidence upon
but was not permitted to present evidence that he was not served
with nor provided notice of any arraignment in Kentucky, that the
affidavits of Joel Rich and Thomas Simpson in support of the
rendition were false, and that he had not "taken refuge in the
State of Utah," as asserted in the Warrant of the Governor of the
State of Utah. Mr. Boudreaux should have been permitted to present
evidence upon but was not permitted by the trial court to present
evidence upon the two (2), prior attempts to extradite him by the
State of Kentucky upon identical claims and the granting by the
trial court of his two (2), prior habeas corpus petitions which
blocked both of Kentucky's attempts at extradition.
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A person

incarcerated in Utah may use the habeas corpus remedy to challenge
the effect in Utah of a detainer or rendition request filed by
another state and a proposed transfer of custody thereto. Gibson v.
Morris,

646 P.2d

743

(Utah 1982) .

In such a habeas corpus

proceeding the burden of proof is upon the petitioner. Syddall v.
Turner, 437 P.2d 194 (Utah 1968).

In a trial upon a petition for

writ of habeas corpus the burden is upon the petitioner to present
evidence that he is wrongfully incarcerated. Farrow v. Smith, 541
p.2d 1107 (Utah 1975); Larrabee v. Turner, 480 P.2d 134 (Utah
1971) .

When there is fraud, falsity, bad faith or abuse in the

performance of duty by a state official the courts will interfere
in the manner in which an executive department performs it's duties
prescribed by law. Cope v. Toronto, 332 P.2d 977 (Utah 1958).

The

Petitioner, Larry Joe Boudreaux, in his sworn Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus asserted that the affidavits in support of the
request for extradition were false and asserted false fact. R. 7-9.
Mr. Boudreaux asserted the prior findings of the trial court in the
two (2), prior habeas corpus proceedings that the facts asserted by
the officials of the State of Kentucky were false. R. 7-9, 23-25,
26-27, 28-30.

In order to meet his evidentiary burden at trial

upon his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Mr. Boudreaux should
have been permitted by the trial court to present his documentary
evidence and the testimony of his witnesses. Larrabee, id. Farrow,
id.

Tr. p.8 1. 6-7; p. 12, 1. 10-15; p.13,1.14-p.14, 1.9;p.20,
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1.14-19;p.21, 1.16-p.22, 1.25; p. 57,1.1-p.60,1.25; p.75, 1.13-16;
p.80, 1.12-13; p.82, 1.10-25.
On the 4th day of March, 1994, the trial court made it's
findings of fact and ruled that the Petitioner's child support was
being collected by the State of Utah through it's URESA actions
then pending and that each of the affidavits upon which the
Governor's Warrant was issued are defective and false and the facts
stated in said affidavits are not true. R. 23-25.

URESA has been

repealed and the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA),
U.C.A. Sections 78-45f-100, et seq., was enacted in it's place.
Utah
Uniform

Code Annotated, Sections

Reciprocal

Enforcement

of

77-31-1 et seq., the

Support Act,

governed

and

provided the rights and duties of the demanding state, Kentucky,
the asylum state, Utah, and the Petitioner, Mr. Boudreaux at the
time of the two (2), prior extradition attempts and habeas corpus
proceedings.

The replacement statute, UIFSA, now provides the

rights and duties of the demanding state, Kentucky, the asylum
state, Utah, and the Petitioner, Mr. Boudreaux.

UIFSA also

provides the authority, powers and duties of the trial court in
this proceeding as did the predecessor statute.
At the time of the State of Kentucky's two (2), prior
attempts to extradite the Petitioner, and Mr. Boudreaux's two (2),
previous proceedings upon his Petitions for Writs of Habeas Corpus,
Utah

Code

Annotated,

Section

77-31-5,
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provided

that,

"the

provisions for extradition of criminals not inconsistent herewith
shall apply to any such demand although the person whose surrender
is demanded was not in the demanding state at the time of the
commission of the crime and although he had not fled therefrom."
Like the former URESA, UIFSA provides at Section 78-45f801 (3)f that, "(3) A provision for the extradition of individuals
not inconsistent with this chapter applies to the demand even if
the individual whose surrender is demanded was not in the demanding
state when the crime was allegedly committed and has not fled
therefrom."
U.C.A.

The provisions for extradition of the Petitioner,

Sections

77-30-1

inconsistent with UIFSA.

et

seq.,

apply

when

they

are

nnot

Thus, the Petitioner, Mr. Boudreaux,

pursuant to UIFSA, Sections 78-45f-207, 78-45f-209, 78-45f-301, 784 5f-303, 7 8-45f-305, 78-45f-316f 7 8-45f-318, 7 8-45f-4 01, 7 8-45f506, 78-45f-604, 78-45f-606, 78-45f-607, and 78-45f-613 and 78-45f614, is permitted to present evidence and defenses to the trial
court.
The former U.C.A. Section 77-31-7, provided that the
duties of support of the Petitioner are those required by the State
of Utah because Mr. Boudreaux was present in Utah during the period
for which support is sought. Similarly, UIFSA, at Sections 78-45f207, and 604, provide that the laws of the State of Utah control
the proceeding and govern the nature, exttent, amount, and duration
of the current payments and other obligations of support and the
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payment arrearages under the Utah divorce decree. In Utah the
statute of limitations for child support arrearages is eight (8),
years, under U.C.A. Section 78-12-22. Seeley v. Park, 532 P.2d 684
(Utah 1975).

The Decree of Divorce which ordered the payment of

child support by the Petitioner was issued by the Third Judicial
District Court for Tooele County within the State of Utah.

The

State of Utah, through it's Office of Recovery Services has been
collecting Mr. Boudreaux's child support on behalf of the State of
Kentucky at the request of Kentucky by it's Interstate Child
Support Enforcement Transmittal dated September 24, 1991, wherein
Kentucky asserted a total child support arrearage of $3,784.00, as
of August 1, 1991. Exhibit 2.
The former, U.C.A. Section 77-31-20, provided that, "The
Court shall conduct a proceeding under this act in the manner
prescribed by law for an action for the enforcement of the type of
duty of support claimed.

The claimant was Kentucky and the trial

court permitted the presentation of testimony and documentary
evidence in the two (2), prior proceedings and entered Findings of
Fact thereupon. R. 1-46.
The former U.C.A. Sections 77-31-20, through 77-31-27,
provided

for

the powers

and

duties

of

the

determining child support issues and facts.

trial

court

in

Again similarly,

UIFSA, sections 78-45f-207, 209, 301, 303, 305, 316, 318, 401, 604,
606, 607, 607, and 614, provide the authority, powers and duties of
35

the trial court in this proceeding.

The trial court was entitled

to find the amount Mr. Boudreaux owes in child support., order
payment and take other actions to insure the payment of child
support including, but not limited to, staying the proceeding.
The claim of the State of Utah that the Petitioner is not
permitted to present evidence is wrong because the UCEA applies
only when it is not inconsistent with UIFSA.
45f-801(3).

UIFSA permits

affirmative defenses.

U.C.A. Section 78-

the presentation

of evidence and

The Petitioner's sworn statements in his

Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, together with the
attachments thereto, the records of the Office of Recovery Services
of the State of Utah, the prior orders and Findings of Fact of the
trial court in the prior habeas corpus proceeding all show that the
Office of Recovery Services has been successful in collecting child
support from the Petitioner, Mr. Boudreaux.
It must be noted here that the State of Utah presented no
documentary nor testimonial evidence at the trial upon the Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus, nor did the State proffer any evidence
which would controvert the evidence proffered and sworn statements
by Mr. Boudreaux.
The trial court granted the State of Utah's motion to
dismiss Mr. Boudreaux's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, and
deny the writ summarily, without allowing the Petitioner to present
evidence in support of the petition. Tr. p. 98.
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The trial court,

after dismissing the petition for writ of habeas corpus, allowed
the submission of documentary evidence and the testimony of Mr.
Boudreaux's witnesses for the sole purpose of protecting the record
for appeal. Tr. pp. 98-100.
testimony

Mr. Boudreaux proffered his own

(Tr. pp. 100-102), the testimony of his bankruptcy

counsel, Mr. Enderton, (Tr. pp. 102-108), the testimony of Mr. Glen
Frandsen of the State of Utah, Office of Recovery Services, and the
testimony of Assistant Attorney General for Recovery Services,
Lance Dean. (Tr. pp. 108-119.)
exception

of

the

The trial court also, upon the

Petitioner,

permitted

the

admission

of

Petitioner's Exhibits 1-5, into the record (Tr. p. 122), and took
judicial notice of the two (2), prior extradition attempts by the
State of Kentucky and the two (2), prior habeas corpus proceedings
before

the

trial

court,

case

numbers

931600149,

940600636,

941600173, 941600581, and 981600111. (Tr. pp. 119-121.)
The order of the trial court summarily dismissing Mr.
Boudreaux's Verified

Petition

for Writ

of Habeas Corpus and

prohibiting him from presenting his documentary and testimonial
evidence must be reversed.

The failure of the trial court to

permit the Petitioner to present evidence of the denials of his
rights of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, and the other
UIFSA evidence he proffered, is itself a denial of Mr. Boudreaux's
right of due process.

Alternatively, the appellate court should

instruct the trial court to make findings of fact based upon the
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evidence profferred by Mr. Boudreaux and his witnesses inasmuch as
the State of Utah did not present any evidence in the proceeding,
or at trial, whatsoever.
THE EXTRADITION ATTEMPT BY KENTUCKY AND
THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS ARE RES JUDICATA
The State of Kentucky and the State of Utah have made two
(2), prior attempts to extradite the Petitioner, Mr. Boudreaux,
both of which were denied by the trial court. R. 5-9, 18-22, 23-25,
26-27, 28-30.

The facts before the trial court upon the present,

and third, attempt to extradite the Petitioner are identical as
those in the two (2), prior extradition requests by the State of
Kentucky and the State of Utah, except that the Petitioner has
continued to pay his child support regularly since the prior
attempts to extradite him. R. 7-9.

Two (2), prior petitions for

Writ of Habeas Corpus have been granted the Petitioner, Mr.
Boudreaux, based upon identical facts and law asserted by all
parties to this action.

Habeeas Corpus is a civil remedy and

because the trial court had ruled heretofor on the state's requests
for extradition the issues are res judicata.

The matter had been

dismissed with prejudice on two (2), prior occasions as shown by
the two (2), Orders and Findings of the trial court. R. 5-9, 18-22,
23-25, 26-27, 28-30.
Utah and Kentucky assert that their present extradition
attempt

is not

res

judicata

because

in the

two

(2), prior

applications for extradition, Mr. Boudreaux was identified as a
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fugitive from justice having taken refuge in the State of Utah, and
in the present extradition attempt he is identified as a nonfugitive having taken refuge in the State of Utah.

The change of

a single word in the application by the State of Kentucky and the
State of Utah do not prohibit application of the equitable defense
of res judicata.

The facts of the present attempt at extradition

are the same as the facts of the two

(2), prior attempts at

extradition of Mr. Boudreaux. The trial court previously ruled and
made findings of fact that, "Each of the affidavits upon which the
Governor's Warrant was issued are defective and false and the facts
stated therein are not true." R. 24, paragraph 8.

Substantively,

the factual claims of the State of Kentucky in the present attempt
at extradition are identical to the facts of the prior attempts at
extradition. Mr. Boudreaux asserted in his sworn petition that the
facts asserted in the affidavits supporting rendition are false and
supported his claim with the records of the Office of Recovery
Services. R. 1-46.

The State of Kentucky, when it requested

interstate child support enforcement, Exhibit 2, asserted child
support arrearages of $3,784.00 as of August 1, 1991, directly
controverting the factual assertion of the affidavits supporting
the present request for extradition. Exhibit 2.
The doctrine of res judicate is applicable to habeas
corpus proceedings and should have been applied here by the trial
court, or at least considered. Burleiah v. Turner, 38 P.2d 412
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(Utha 1964); Wright v. Carver, 886 P.2d 58 (Utah 1994); Andrews v.
Carver, 789 F. Supp. 659 (D.Utah 1992).

The burden is upon the

State of Utah and the State of Kentucky to show that their present
extradition attempt and Mr. Boudreaux's present Verified Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus falls outside of the doctrine of res
judicata.

The State of Kentucky nor the State of Utah presented

any evidence whatsoever in the proceeding regarding Mr. Boudreaux's
res judicata defense.

Tr. 89-98.

The doctrine of res judicata in

habeas corpus proceedings does not only work to the benefit of the
state.

The application of the equitable doctrine of res judicata

should apply equitably and to the benefit and detriment of all of
the parties to this action.

If the issues have been previously

determined by the trial court in two (2), prior proceedings then
the Petitioner should have the benefit of the application of the
doctrine of res judicata in subsequent cases involving unlawful
restraints upon his liberty. Tr. 89-96.

The trial court took

judicial notice of and in case numbers 931600149, 940600581, and
940600636, ruled that the restraint upon the liberty of Mr.
Boudreaux was illegal and violated his constitutional right of due
process.

Tr. p. 119-123. The two prior grants of habeas corpus to

Mr. Boudreaux upon the basis of false facts stated in affidavits of
Thomas Simpson, his filing of an affidavit in support of the
present attempt at extradition, and the prior rulings of the trial
court that the State of Utah, Office of Recovery Services has been
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successfully collecting child support from Mr. Boudreaux, entitle
Mr. Boudreaux to assert the defense of res judicata, and to present
evidence and affirmative defenses.

The Petition of Mr. Boudreaux

should have been granted summarily given that the State of Utah and
the State of Kentucky failed to file an answer to the petition and
failed to present any evidence whatsoever controverting the sworn
assertions of Mr. Boudreaux, his documentary evidence and his
witnesses (which were proffered and excepted into evidence by the
trial court for the purpose of appeal. Tr. pp. 119-123.)

The

present extradition attempt by the State of Kentucky is unsupported
and in light of the prior proceedings, frivolous.

THE DISTRICT COURT HAS EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER CHILD SUPPORT
AND MR. BOUDREAUX'S CHILD SUPPORT HAS BEEN SUCCESSFULLY COLLECTED
Mr. Boudreaux has paid and the State of Utah, Office of
Recovery Services have successfully collected the Utah ordered
child support for the child of Mr. Boudreaux who was eighteen (18),
years old in January, 1998.

This is shown by the records of the

Office of Recovery Services which are attached to his sworn
petition. R. 31-38.

It is also proved by the records of the State

of Utah, Office of Recovery Services that were excepted and
proffered into evidence at the hearing. Exhibit 4, and Exhibit 2.
The State presented no documents, proffered no witnesses and
presented no evidence conrotverting Mr. Boudreaux's assertion of
successful collection of child support.
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The Recovery Services records show that Mr. Boudreaux
paid

his

ongoing

child

support, and

often paid

his ongoing

obligation together with substantial contributions toward his child
support arrearages. Exhibit 4.

His ongoing obigation ceased in

January, 1998.
Payments toward the child support

arrearage by Mr.

Boudreaux ceased in March, 1998, until October, 1998, when the
Office of Recovery Services received a payment $519.26, from the
United States Bankruptcy Court Trustee in Mr. Boudreaux's Chapter
13, case pursuant to the proof of claim of Recovery Services for
arrearages. Exhibit 1; Exhibit 2, Proof of Claim; Exhibit 4, p.l,
payment for October, 1998.

The Chapter 13 plan of Mr. Boudreaux

and the Order of the United States Bankruptcy Court provides that
the child support arrears will be paid in full by Mr. Boudreaux and
the United States Trustee. One Hundred percent (100%), payment of
Mr. Boudreaux's Utah ordered child support obligation, including
arrearages,
Generally,

is. successful
debts

are

collection

subject

to

of

his

discharge

child
in

a

support.
bankruptcy

proceeding but an exception exists when the debt is child support
arrearages. Baaas v. Anderson, 528 P.2d 141,143 (Utah 1974); State
by and through Utah State Dept. Of Social Services v. SUCEC, 924
P.2d 882 (Utah 1996).
Moreover,

Kentucky

has

no

jurisdiction

over

the

collection of child support arrearages, criminal or civil, ordered
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by a Utah Decree of Divorce and collected by the State of Utah,
Office of Recovery Services.

The district courts of Utah have

exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over the collection of past
due child support. State v. Child Support Enforcement, 888 P. 2d
960, 963 (Utah App. 1993).
The trial court should have permitted Mr. Boudreaux to
present evidence upon the issue of successful collection of child
support pursuant to UIFSA.

The trial court should have found based

upon the sworn statements and proffered evidence of Mr. Boudreaux
that

Office

of Recovery

Services

for the State

of Utah is

successfully collecting child support from Mr. Boudreaux.

This

Honorable Court should instruct the trial court to enter findings
of fact supporting the conclusion that Mr. Boudreaux's child
support is being successfully collected.

The State of Utah,

representing the State of Kentucky, presented no evidence upon the
issues.

Mr. Boudreaux's Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus should be granted and the State of Kentucky should be
prohibited from further attempts to extradite him.

MR. BOUDREAUX'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS HAVE BEEN VIOLATED
AND HIS PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS SHOULD BE GRANTED
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States of America provides, "No person shall be... deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law..."
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
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United States of America provides, "...nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law..."
Mr.

Boudreaux

asserted

in

his

sworn

petition

the

unconsitiutional restraint upon his liberty by his arrest and
incarceration in the Sanpete County Jail by the rendition request
of the State of Kentucky and the actions of the State of Utah. R.
3-13.
He

was

not

notified

of

any

Kentucky

grand

jury

proceedings against him. R. 1-13, R. 184. He was not notified on
any arraignment proceeding in Kentucky enabling him to appear
before the Kentucky court. R. 1-13, R. 184, R. 111-125, R. 121.
The warrant of the Governor of the State of Utah refers to Mr.
Boudreaux as having taken refuge in Utah presumably in order to
avoid prosecution of a crime in Kentucky.

The statement is false.

Mr. Boudreaux has always resided and been domociled in the State of
Utah. R. 1-13. The State of Utah nor the State of Kentucky
presented controverting evidence that Mr. Boudreaux was notified of
an arraignment, or grand jury proceedings nor that Mr. Boudreaux
had taken refuge in the State of Utah.
The State of Kentucky claims in their criminal proceeding
that Mr. Boudreaux is a fugitive and that he failed to appear for
an arraignment before that court.
p.7.

Warrant of Arrest, Exhibit 5,

The warrant asserts that Mr. Boudreaux may give no bail or
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bond. Exhibit 5, p. 7.

The failure by the State of Kentucky to

notify Mr. Boudreaux of an arraignment proceeding, and the issuance
of a no bail warrant for his arrest based upon his failure to
appear and the arraignment, and his arrest upon such a warrant, is
a violation of his rights of due process guaranteed by the Fifth
Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States of America.

Mr. Boudreaux was arrested in Sanpete

County on August 24, 1998, and today remains deprived of his
liberty in the Sanpete County Jail.
Another

basis

by which

the

State

of

Kentucky

has

unconstitutionally deprived Mr. Boudreaux of his liberty and right
of due process are the affidavits of Mr. Thomas Simpson and Mr.
Joel Rich which state false facts. R. 1-46.

When there is fraud,

falsity, bad faith, clear default, or abuse in the performance of
a duty a court should interfere in the manner in which an executive
authority performs it's duties prescribed by law. Cope v. Toronto,
332 P.2d 977 (Utah 1958).

Habeas corpus is used to protect anyone,

including Mr. Boudreaux, who is restrained of his liberty where
there exists no jurisdiction or authority, or where the requirement
of the law have been so ignored or distorted that the party is
substantially and effectively denied what is included in the term
due process of law, or where some other circumstance exists which
would make it wholly unconscionable not to consider the matter.
Bryant v. Turner, 431 P.2d 121 (Utah 1967); Dunn v. Cook, 791 P.2d
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873 (Utah 1990); Galleaos v. Turner, 409 P.2d 386 (Utah 1965).

The

statement of false facts in conclusoryf unsupported affidavits
which to not meet the minimum requirements for affidavits made upon
personal knowledge

(the affidavits contain no attestations of

personal knowledge and are clearly hearsay) in the State of Utah,
deprives Mr. Boudreaux of his constitutional rights of due process.
The State of Kentucky chose not to give Mr. Boudreaux
notification of it's arraignment hearing and then, based upon his
failure to appear for that arraignment issue a warrant for his
arrest which prohibits bail because he failed to appear. Exhibit 5.
R. 238, Tr. p. 22.

The State of Kentucky chose to support it's

request for rendition of Mr. Boudreaux by the conclusory and
evidentiarily insufficient, unsupported affidavits stating false
facts of it's public officials Mr. Thomas Simpson and Mr. Joel
Rich.

The State of Kentucky is bound by the affidavits when it

supports an extradition request by them. The affidavits state false
facts, as they did in the two (2), prior extradition attempts. The
State of Kentucky has violated the constutionally guaranteed rights
of

due

process

and

liberty which

should

be enjoyed

by Mr.

Boudreaux.
The State of Utah and the State of Kentucky presented no
evidence that the affidavits of Kentucky's public officials, Mr.
Simpson and Mr. Rich, were supported and not false.
Mr. Boudreaux has been restrained from his liberty by
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incarceration

in

the

Sanpete

County

Jail

upon

the

unlawful

insistance of the State of Kentucky and the State of Utah since
August, 1998.

He remains incarcerated today, the trial court

having denied him bail, or release from incarceration.
Honorable

Court

should

immediately

and

summarily

grant

This
Mr.

Boudreaux's petition for writ of habeas corpus and instruct the
trial court to release Mr. Boudreaux from jail.

MR. BOUDREAUX SHOULD BE RELEASED FROM
INCARCERATION OR ADMITTED TO BAIL
On December 7, 1998, Mr. Boudreaux requested that the
trial court release him from incarceration in the Sanpete County
Jail, or otherwise admit him to bail. R. 238, Tr. pp. 21-41.

The

trial court denied Mr. Boudreaux's release from incarceration in
the Sanpete County Jail, and denied his request for bail. R.238,
Tr. pp. 39-41.
The Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States

of

America

provides,

"Excessive

bail

shall

not

be

required..."
Article

I, Section

8, of the Constitution

of Utah

provides, "(1) All persons charged with a crime shall be bailable
except: ...(c) except persons charged with any other crime,... if
there is substantial evidence to support the charge and the court
finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person would
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constitute a substantial danger to any other person or to the
community or is likely to flee the jurisdiction of the court if
released on bail."
UIFSA, U.C.A. Section 78-45f-801(3), provides that, "(3)
A provision for extradition of individuals not inconsistent with
this chapter applies to the demand even if the individual whose
surrender is demanded was not in the demanding state when the crime
was

allegedly

committed

and

has

not

fled

therefrom."

The

provisions for extradition of the Petitioner apply when they are
not inconsistent with UIFSA.
Mr. Boudreaux was admitted to bail after his arrest and
incarceration in the first attempt by Kentucky to extradite him
after the issuance of the Utah Governor's Warrant and appeared
before the trial court at every hearing.

His petition for writ of

habeas corpus was granted. R. 1-28, R. 238, Tr. pp. 21-41.
Mr. Boudreaux was released upon his own recognizance the
second time he was arrested and jailed upon a warrant from Kentucky
and after the issuance of the Utah Governor's Warrant. R. 1-28, R.
238, Tr. pp. 21-41.
Mr. Boudreaux poses no risk of danger to the community
nor a substantial risk to any other person in the community.
not a risk of flight.

He is

He has appeared at each hearing in each of

the three (3), habeas corpus proceedings, including those two (2),
prior proceeding when he was admitted to bail.
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The State of Utah

has filed no criminal information against Mr, Boudreaux.
The trial court ruled that even though Mr. Boudreaux was
bailable factually, the release from incarceration, and upon bail
was prohibited by Emia v. Hayward, 703 P.2d 1043 (Utah 1985). R.
238, Tr. p. 41, Tr. pp. 21-41, 36-38.
Mr. Boudreaux is entitled to release from incarceration,
or bail.

To deprive him of release, and bail, violates the

provisions of the Utah Constitution Article I, Section 8, the
Eighth Amendment

to the United

States Constitution, and the

provisions of UIFSA, which provides the powers and duties of the
trial court and the rights of Mr. Boudreaux, the State of Kentucky
and the State of Utah.

The denial of bail to Mr. Boudreaux is

inconsistent with the rendition provision, and the powers and
authority provisions of UIFSA.

He should have been permitted bail

pending the trial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, and
pending the review by this Honorable Court.

Mr. Boudreaux should

be immediately released from incarceration, or admitted to bail.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Boudreaux's sworn Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
should be granted because he has been denied his constitutional
right of due process.

He should have been permitted by the trial

court to present evidence, testimony of witnesses and documentary
evidence.

The habeas corpus remedy is res judicata because of the

two prior grants of habeas corpus by the trial court upon identical
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facts,

Mr. Boudreaux's

child

support

is being

successfully

collected by the State of Utah, Office of Recovery Services. Mr.
Boudreaux should be released from incarceration, or admitted to
bail, and his petition should be granted.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED thifl^&th d^L of April, 1999.

^ ANDREW B. BERR>,
Attorney for
Larry Joe Bo;dd:
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING AND SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 9th day of April, 1999, I
mailed, postage prepaid and by first class mail, two (2), true and
correct copies of the foregoing Br-ie£—Qf„ Appellant to Mark E.
Burns, Assistant Attorney General'," Attorney^'for Appellee, at 160
East 300 South, #600, Post Office^ Box 140841, Sfclt Lake City, Utah
84114.
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ADDENDUM
A.

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Judgment and Order

B.

Notice of Appeal

C.

Utah Decree of Divorce, dated April 14, 1982

D.

Findings of Fact and Order Upon Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus, March 4, 1994

E.

Order Upon Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, March 6, 1995

F.

U.C.A. 78-45f-100 et seq., UIFSA
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ROSS C. BLACKHAM #03 57
Sanpete County Attorney
Sanpete County Courthouse
160 North Main
Manti, Utah 84642
Telephone: (435) 835-6381
Facsimile: (435)835-6383

QfbJUTV^

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SANPETE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
LARRY JOE BOUDREAUX,
Petitioner,

]

vs.

))

STATE OF UTAH,

]
Respondent.

I

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Case No. 980600302
Assigned Judge: David L. Mower

The Petitioner's Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus and Respondent's Motion to Dismiss
having come before the Court for hearing on October 30,1998. The Petitioner, Larry Joe Boudreaux
was personally present in Court and represented by his attorney, Andrew W. Berry, Jr.. The
Respondent was represented by Ross C. Blackham, Sanpete County Attorney. The Court having
examined the documents submitted into evidence by stipulation of the parties and having heard oral
arguments thereon, now makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - Boudreaux - 980600302 - Page 2

FINDINGS OF FACT
1) On August 5,1998, Governor Paul E. Patten of the State of Kentucky executed a demand
to the Governor of Utah to surrender to Kentucky Larry Joe Boudreaux a.k.a. Larry Boudreaux,
Larry J. Boudreaux and Larry Joe Bordreaux alleging that the person to be surrendered had
committed the crime offlagrantnon-support, committed while outside the State of Kentucky which
resulted in the commission of a crime within the State of Kentucky.
2) Governor Patten also sent with the extradition demand an Indictment dated June 5*, 1996,
charging Larry Boudreaux in Webster County, Kentucky with Flagrant Non-Support, a Class D
Felony and a Warrant of Arrest for Larry Boudreaux dated January 15, 1997. Governor Patten
certified these two documents to be authentic in accordance with the laws of the State of Kentucky,
as well as all other documents submitted in aid of the demand.
3) That Paul E. Patten is the Governor of the State of Kentucky and the executive authority
of the State of Kentucky.
4)

On August 24, 1998, as a result of the demand from Kentucky Governor Patten,

Governor Michael O. Leavitt of the State of Utah issued his Governor's Warrant for Larry Joe
Boudreaux, a.k.a. Larry Boudreaux, Larry J. Boudreaux, Larry Joe Bordreaux .
5)

On the 31*, day of August, 1998, Police Officers from Mt. Pleasant Citv Police

Department arrested the Petitioner based on Governor Leavitt's Warrant.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - Boudreau^ - 980600302 - Page 3

6) That the person arrested and in Court on the date of this hearing is one and the same
Lany Joe Boudreaux demanded by the State of Kentucky.
7) The documents submitted by Kentucky and Governor Leavitt's Warrant all appear on
their face to be in order. The phrase in Governor Leavitt's Warrant that the accused has "taken
refuge in the State of Utah" is not a reference to the accused being a fugitive from the State of
Kentucky but a reference to him being present in the State of Utah.
8) The Petitioner did not have notice of the Grand Jury proceedings in Kentucky.
9) The Petitioner did not receive notice of arraignment proceedings in Kentucky.
10)

Petitioner is charged with a crime under the laws of the demanding State, to wit:

Kentucky, and a charging document has been issued.
11) The State of Kentucky is seeking the Petitioner as a person who has committed an act
in the State of Utah which results in a crime in the State of Kentucky even though the Petitioner was
not in the State of Kentucky at the time of the commission of the crime and has not fled therefrom.
12) The State of Kentucky has made a prior attempt to extradite Mr. Boudreaux and that
the Governor of Utah has issued two prior Governor's Warrants for Mr. Boudreaux. A different
issue is present in the present case from the prior attempt to extradite Mr. Boudreaux and that is
whether or not the Petitioner may be surrendered as a non fugitive.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - Boudreaux - 980600302 • Page 4

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1) The demand made by the State of Kentucky for the Petitioner as a non-fugitive is legally
sufficient and authorized under §77-30-6, Utah Code Annotated.
2) The requirements of §77-30-3, Utah Code Annotated, for the extradition ofthe Petitioner
have been satisfied.
3) Resjudicata is not a bar to the present proceedings.
4) The Respondent's Motion to Dismiss the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus should be
granted.
DATED this ^

day of November, 1998.
BY THE COURT:

£\Mi^
DAVfff L. MOWER
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I have mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing
FINDINGS OF FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to the petitioner's attorney, Andrew W.
Berry, Jr. at P.O. Box 600, Moroni, Utah 84646, postage prepaid this 4^day of November, 1998.
\^

Secretary!'

ROSS C. BLACKHAM #0357
Sanpete County Attorney
Sanpete County Courthouse
160 North Main
Manti, Utah 84642
Telephone: (435) 835-6381
Facsimile: (435)835-6383

&1ktor\

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SANPETE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

LARRY JOE BOUDREAUX,
Petitioner,

]
]

vs.

)

STATE OF UTAH,

)
Respondent.

]I

JUDGEMENT AND ORDER

Case No. 980600302
Assigned Judge: David L. Mower

The Petitioner's Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus and Respondent's Motion to Dismiss
having come before the Court for hearing on October 30,1998. The Petitioner, Larry Joe Boudreaux
was personally present in Court and represented by his attorney, Andrew W. Berry, Jr.. The
Respondent was represented by Ross C. Blackham, Sanpete County Attorney. The Court having
entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
NOW, THEREFORE, THE COURT ORDERS, JUDGES AND DECREES that the
Respondent's Motion to Dismiss Petitioner's Writ of Habeas Corpus is granted.

JUDGEMENT AND ORDER - Boudreaux - 980600302 - Page 2

The Petitioner shall be remanded to the custody of duly authorized agents from the State of
Kentucky.
DATED this ' 3 day of November, 1998.
BY THE COURT;

l-\Mt

K

DAVID L. MOWER
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I have mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing
JUDGEMENT AND ORDER to the petitioner's attorney, Andrew W. Berry, Jr. at P.O. Box 600,
Moroni, Utah 84646, postage prepaid thisj^day of November, 1998.

ANDREW B. BERRY, JR. USB #0309
Attorney for Larry Joe Boudreaux
62 West Main Street
Post Office Box 600
Moroni, Utah 84646-0600
Telephone: 801 436-8200

OMM^

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SANPETE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
LARRY JOE BOUDREAUX,

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Petitioner,
Case Number 980600302

vs.
STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent.

Assigned to:
Honorable David L. Mower
ooOoo

The Petitioner, LARRY JOE BOUDREAUX, hereby appeals to
the Utah Supreme Court the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order of the Sixth Judicial District Court for Sanpete County
within the State of Utah entered on the ^>o

day of November,

1998, the Honorable David L. Mower, presiding.
DATED this ^ S

day o(f Novembej

ANDREW B. BERRY?
Attorney for Larry Jtoe Boudreaux

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND MAILING
I hereby certify that on this
of November,
1998, I served upon and mailed, postage prepaid and by first class
mail, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Appeal, to
Mr. Ross C. Blackham, the Sanpete County Attorney, at the Sanpete
County Courthouse, 160 North Main Street, Manti, Utah 84642, and to
the Jan Graham, the Utah Attorney Gen^jgai, and^er deputy Christine
Soltis, at 236 State Capitol Building, Salt LakeSpity, Utah 84114.

^ n O ' v - U ..: I- DEFENDANT'S
I r

If
DOUGLAS F . WHITE

«g^ Apr ]/\
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EXHIBIT

£__

-.A'JU

Attorney for Plaintiff
Prudential Plaza
165 North Main, Suite B-l
Tooele, Utah 84074
Telephone: 882-2272
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF. THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * * * * * *

*

LARRY JOE BOUDREAUX,
Plaintiff,

DECREE OF DIVORCE

vs.
HELANIE LYNN BOUDREAUX,

Civil No. 81-0772

Defendant.
* * * * * * * * * * * * *

This natter having come on regularly on the 22nd day of
March, 1982, before the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., Judge,
the plaintiff appearing in person and being represented by his
counsel, Douglas F. White, Esquire, and the defendant having
duly executed her Appearance and Waiver, and the Court having
entered the default of the defendant herein, and the Court
having received evidence, including the testimony of the
I plaintiff, and the case having been submitted to the Court for
its determination and decision and more than ninety (90) days
having elapsed since the filing of said Complaint, and the Court,
having inquired into the legal sufficiency offctTe-.evidenceso
adduced, NOW THEREFORE, and upon motion of plaintiff Is -counsel,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

That the plaintiff be and he is hereby awarded.a

Decree of Divorce from the defendant, upon the grounds'tft mental
cruelty and that the marriage between plaintiff and dej.enuauu-j.6

k

This matter having come on regularly on the 22nd day of
March, 1982, before the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., Judge,
the plaintiff appearing in person and being represented by his
counsel, Douglas F. White, Esquire, and the defendant having
duly executed her Appearance and Waiver, and the Court having
II entered the default of the defendant herein, and the Court
I having received evidence, including the testimony of the
I plaintiff, and the case having been submitted to the Court for
its determination and decision and more than ninety (90) days
having elapsed since the filing of said Complaint, and the Court
having inquired into the legal sufficiency of the evidence so
adduced, NOW THEREFORE, and upon motion of plaintiff's counsel,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

That the plaintiff be and he is hereby awarded a

Decree of Divorce from the defendant, upon the grounds of mental
cruelty and that the marriage between plaintiff and ueienuaul is
hereby dissolved.and the parties are hereby freed and absolutely
released from the bonds of matrimony and all of the obligations
thereof, provided that this Decree shall not become final and
absolute until the expiration of three (3) months from its
entry, at which time this Decree shall become final and
absolute without any further or other action of the parties.

-22.

Awarding the care, custody and control of the minor

child of the parties to defendant, who as her mother is a
fit and proper person to have said custody, care and control
awarded to her, subject to plaintiff's right of visitation at
all reasonable times and places.
3.

Plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay to defendant as and

for support ot tne minor child the sum of $200.00 per month.
4.

That during the marriage of the parties defendant has

treated plaintiff cruelly causing him great mental distress and
suffering until he is unable to continue the marriage

j
!

relationship, to-wit:

the parties fought and argued continually
i

to the point that they were unable to continue the marriage
relationship.
5.

Ordering plaintiff to assume and pay the debts and

obligations of the parties incurred to the time of separation.
6.

Ordering plaintiff to maintain health and accident

insurance for the benefit of the parties1 minor child, where
available at his place of employment.
7.

Ordering plaintiff to obtain a policy of life insurance

at 510,000.00 on his person and make the minor child of the
parties the beneficiary thereof.
8.

Ordering the plaintiff to pay for all attorney's fees

and costs of court incurred in this action for himself and the
defendant.
9.

Awarding plaintiff and defendant as their sole and

separate property that property which they now have in their
possession, whatever it might be.
DATED this

/ 7 day ot April, 1982.

|

to the point that they were unable to <—.itinue the marriage

I

relationship.
5.

Ordering plaintiff to assume and pay the debts and

obligations of the parties incurred to the time of separation.
6.

Ordering plaintiff to maintain health and accident

insurance for the benefit of the parties' minor childf where
available at his place of employment.
7.

Ordering plaintiff to obtain a policy of life insurance

at $10,000.00 on his person and make the minor child of the
parties the beneficiary thereof.
8.

Ordering the plaintiff to pay for all attorney's fees

and costs of court incurred in this action for himself and the
defendant.
9.

Awarding plaintiff and defendant as their sole and

separate property that property which they now have in their
possession, whatever it might be.
DATED this

/ J day of April, 1982.

n

ANDREW B. BERRY, JR. 0309
Attorney for Petitioner
62 West M a m Street
P.O. Box 600
Moroni, Utah 84646-0600
Telephone: 801 436-8200

III THE SIXTH JUCICIAL DISTRICT; COURT FOR SANPETE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
coOoo
FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

LARRY JOE 30UEREAUX,
Petitioner,

Case No. 9316C0149

vs.
STATE OF UTAH,

Assigned to:
Honorable Don V. Tibbs

Respondant.
ooOoo

This matter came on for a regularly scheduled evidentiary
hearing upon the Petition of Larry J, Boudreaux
Habeas

Corpus

on

the

2nd

day

of

February,

for a Writ of

1994, before

the

Honorable Don V. Tibbs, Sixth Judicial District Court Judge.

The

Petitioner, Larry Joe Boudreaux, was present and represented by his
counsel, Andrew B. Berry, Jr., ana the State of Utah was present
and represented by itf s counsel, Ross C. Blackham, Sanpete County
Attorney.

The parties presented the testimony of witnesses.

THE

COURT, upon the testimony of the witnesses, the stipulation of the
parties, the pleadings on file herein and good cause appearing
therefore, hereby makes and enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. On the 16th day December, 1993, the State of Kentucky
submitted it's application fir a Governor's Warrant to :ht State of

«

Utah.
2.

On the 17th day of December, 1993, the Governor of

the State of Utah, Michael O. Leavitt, issued his warrant for the
arrest of the Petitioner, Larry Joe Boudreaux.
3.

The Governor's Warrant asserts thar the Petitioner

stands charged v/ith the crime of Flagrant Nonsupport and asserts
that the Petitioner committed said crime in the County of Sanpete
within the State of Kentucky.
4.

The Governor's Warrant: asserts thar tne Petitioner

fled from the justice of the State of Kentucky and has taken refuge
in the State of Utah.
5.

The Petitioner did not flee the State of Kentucky.

6.

The Petitioner is not a fugitive from justice.

7. The Governor's Warrant issued by the Governor Michael
0. Leavitt of the State of Utah is defective.
3.

Each of the affidavits upon which the Governor's

Warrant was issued are defective and false and the facts stated in
said affidavits are not true.
9.

The Department of Human Services, Office of Recovery

Services for the State of Utah and their counterpart in the State
of Nevada have been collecting child support from the Petitioner
through their URESA actions now pending.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
i.

The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus presented by

the Petitioner, Larry Joe Boudreaux, should be granted and the
Governer's Warrant for the arrest of the Petitioner is defective
upon it's face and void and should be denied ana quashed; and

2.

URESA actions by the State of Utah and the State of

Nevada have been successful in collecting child support from the
Petitoner.
3.

The Petitioner did not flee the State of Kentucky.

4.

The Petitioner is not a fugitive from justice.

5. The Governor's Warrant issued by the Governor Michael
0. Leavitt of the State of Utah is defective and void and should be
quashed.
6.

Each of the affidavits upon which tne Governor's

Warrant was issued are defective and false and the facts stated in
said affidavits are not true.
7.

The Information filed by the State of Utah, case

number, 931600149, alleging that the Petitioner is a fugitive from
justice should be dismissed with prejudice.

DATED th

i.j£

day of March, 1994
-BY-THE--GOXJRT:

HONORABLE DD&^J. TIBB3,
Sixth Judircfia 1 District Court

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND MAILING
I hereby certify that on this /stJJ
day of March, 1994,
I served upon and mailed, postage prepaid ana by first class mail,
a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law to Mr.^RCTss C~. "&fc^ckham, the Sanpete County
Attorney, at the Sanpete cd^nty Courthouse, 160 North Main Street,
Manti, Utah 84642.

ANDREW B. BERRY, JR. 0309
Attorney for Petitioner
62 West Main Street
P.O. Box 600
Moroni, Utah 84646-0600
Telephone: 801 436-82CK)

C /-:a\^

III THE SIXTH JUCICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SANPETE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo

Petitioner,

ORDER UPON THE
PETITION FOR URIT
OF HAEEAS CORF US

vs.

Case No. 931600149

LARRY JOE BCUDREAUX,

STATE OF UTAH,
Assigned to:
Honorable Don V. Tibbs

Respondant.
ooOoo

This matter came on for a regularly scheduled evidentiary
hearing upon the Petition of Larry J. Boudreaux for a Writ of
Habeas

Corpus

on

the

2nd

day

of

February,

1994, before

the

Honorable Don V. Tibbs, Sixth Judicial District Court Judge.

The

Petitioner, Larry Joe Boudreaux, was present and represented by his
counsel, Andrew B. Berry, Jr., and the State of Utah was present
and represented by it's counsel, Ross C. Blackham, Sanpete County
Attorney.

The parties presented the testimony of witnesses.

THE

COURT, upon the testimony of the witnesses, the stipulation of the
parties, the pleadings on file herein and good cause appearing
therefore, hereby
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES:
1.

The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus presented by

the Petitioner, Larry Joe Bcudreaux, is granted and the Governer's

•~)t.

the Petitioner is denied and quashed; and
warrant for the arrest of
fiiPd bv the State of Utah, case
The information filed oy
the Petitioner is a fugitive from
number, 931600149, alleging that
2.

justice is dismissed with prejudice.

DATED this _^__ day of March, 1994
BY THE"COURT:

HONORABLE W ^ T l W ,
-Sixth Judicial District Court

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND HAILING
day of Karch, 1994,
I hereby certify that on this a.i-'by first class mail,
Upon the Petition
1
served ^ ^ ^ . ? % £ £ % & Order
Blackham,
the Sanpete
a true and correct copy
thouse,
160
North Main
for Writ of Habeas Corpus
County Attorney, at the
Street, Manti, Utah 8464

T7

FILER
SANPET€ COUNTY. UTAH

*95flHR 6 m I 26
KW5T1NE FV^RiSTIANSEN
ANDREW B. BERRY, JR. 0309
Attorney for Defendant
62 West Main Street
Post Office Box 600
Moroni, Utah 84646-0600
Telephone: 801 436-8200

CLERK

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SANPETE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
LARRY JOE BOUDREAUX,
ORDER UPON PETITION
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner,
vs.

Case No. 931600149
(consolidated tfith
case nos. 9406D0636
9406D0581
941630173

STATE OF UTAH,
Respondant.
ooOoo

This matter came on for^ a regularly scheduled hearing
upon the Petition for Writ of Habeas * Corpus of Larry Jce Boudreaux
on the 16th day of November, 1994, before the Honorable Don V.
Tibbs, Sixth Judicial District Court Judge. The Petitioner, Larry
Joe Boudreaux, was present and represented by his counsel, Andrew
B. Berry, Jr., and the State of Utah was present and represented by
it's counsel, Ross C. Blackham, Sanpete County Attorney.

The

parties entered into stipulations upon the record. THE COURT, upon
the stipulations of the parties, the pleadings on file herein and
good cause appearing therefore, hereby

ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES:
1.

The stipulation of the parties is approved and

adopted by the Court;
2.

The Petitioner is the Larry Joe Boudrea ix named in

the Governor's Warrant dated the 31st day of March, 19 94, and the
State of Kentucky initially claimed approximately

rwenty-four

Thousand Dollars ($24,000.00), in child support arrearages.

The

Petitioner has paid another Four Thousand Six Hundred Dollars
($4,600.00), which has been collected by the State of Utah since
the last evidentiary hearing upon this matter and durinc the period
from February, 1994, through November 16, 1994;
3.

This action is consolidated

with

ccse numbers

940600581, 941600173, and 940600636, and the case number shall
hereafter be 931600149;
4. This ruling is based upon the evidence presented and
the Court's prior rulings in case numbers 931600149, anc 940600581,
and the findings of fact made therein.

The underlying warrant

documents (upon which the present warrant is based), transcript and
evidence presented in those proceedings have been consolidated
herein;
5. The previously entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Order Upon Petition for Writ of Habeas C >rpus shall
stand and remain in effect and said findings, cone usions and
orders are incorporated as though fully set forth herem;

6.

The trial court reserves the right to determine the

amount to award the Petitioner for his damages, costs and attorneyfees

incurred

by

him

in

these

proceedings

which

have

been

consolidated following the appeal- which the State of Utah asserts
it will take from this order; and
7.

The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus of Larry Joe

Boudreaux is granted.

The Governor's Warrant and tie Criminal

Information issued by the State of Utah thereupon is again quashed,
denied and dismissed with prejudice.
DATED this £~~~

day of March, 1995.

3ccr
District Court
I
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this
day of March, 1995,
I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order Upon
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, postage prepaid, and by First
Class Mail, to Ross C. Blackham, Sarjp^^e CourTty^ttorne^ , 160 North
Main Street, Manti, Utah, 84642*

JUDICIAL CODE

tfl

04. Priority o n court calendar.
* ^ the request of a party to a custody proceeding which
I P°° flUestion of existence or exercise of jurisdiction under
**^lf the case shall be given calendar priority and handled
«5. Notices — Orders t o appear — Manner of
**-p^ service.
, Whenever the terms of this act impose a duty upon the
to notify a party or court of a particular fact or action,
^notification may be accomplished by the clerk of the court
oarty to the action upon order of the court.
*'» Orders of the court for parties or persons to appear
;"- the court in accordance with the terms of this act shall
**ude te^ m<^ s u ® c * e n t service of process in accordance
^ the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure unless otherwise
tiered for good cause shown.
i960
^45c-26. Short title.
ftus act may be cited as the "Utah Uniform Child Custody
• A c t i o n Act."
1980

78-45e-4

reflect the amended information and the date of amendment
only.
(5) The voluntary declaration of paternity shall be in the
form prescribed by the state registrar of vital statistics and
shall be accompanied with an explanation of the alternatives
to, the legal consequences of, and the rights and responsibilities that arise from signing the declaration.
(6) The social security number of any person who is subject
to a voluntary declaration of paternity shall be placed in the
records relating to the matter.
1997
78-45e-3. Requirements for filing.
A voluntary declaration of paternity may not be filed with
the state registrar unless the declaration:
(1) is signed by the birth mother and biological father,
and by the legal guardian or a parent of a biological father
who is under 18 years of age, in the presence of two
witnesses who are not related by blood or marriage; and
(2) the mother and alleged father have been given
notice, orally and in writing, of the alternatives to, the
legal consequences of, and the rights and responsibilities
that arise from signing the declaration.
1998

CHAPTER 45d

78-45e-4. Rescission of the declaration.
(1) A signed voluntary declaration of paternity is a legal
finding of paternity, subject to the right of any signatory to
TH5d-l to 78-45d-13. Repealed.
1988 rescind the acknowledgment within the earlier of:
(a) 60 days of signing; or
CHAPTER 46e
(b) the date of an adjninistrative or judicial proceeding
• relating to the child, including a proceeding to establish a
VOLUNTARY DECLARATION OF PATERNITY
support order, in which the signatory is a party.
(2) (a) After the period referred to in Subsection (1), a
#ctoon
signed voluntary declaration of paternity may be chalM5e-1. Chapter title.
lenged in court only on the grounds of fraud, duress, or
M5e-2. Voluntary declaration of paternity.
material
mistake of fact, with the burden of proof on the
M5e-3. Requirements for filing.
challenger.
M5e-4. Rescission of the declaration.
(b) The legal responsibilities, including child support,
of any signatory arising from the declaration may not be
M5e-1. Chapter title.
suspended during a challenge under Subsection (2)(a),
This act is known as the "Voluntary Declaration of Paternity
except for good cause shown.
<t"
1994
(3) In determining whether to rescind the declaration the
court has the same authority and obligation with regard to
M5e-2. Voluntary declaration of paternity.
< 1) (a) A voluntary declaration of paternity filed in compli- genetic testing as is provided in Section 78-45a-7.
(4) A child support order based on the voluntary declaration
ance with this chapter establishes a father-child relationship identical to the relationship established when a child of paternity remains in effect during the pendency of any
proceeding under this section, and until a final order of the
is born to persons married to each other.
(b) When a voluntary declaration of paternity is filed, court rescinding the voluntary declaration.
(5) If the declaration is rescinded, the declarant father may
the liabilities of the father include, but are not limited to,
the reasonable expense of the mother's pregnancy and not recover any child support he provided for the child before
1997
confinement and for the education, necessary support, entry of the order of rescission.
and any funeral expenses for the child.
(c) When a father voluntarily declares paternity, his
CHAPTER 46f
liability for past amounts due is limited to a period of four
UNIFORM INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT
years immediately preceding the date that the voluntary
declaration of paternity was filed.
Parti
' J When a voluntary declaration of paternity is filed it
' ^ recognized as a basis for a child support order without
General Provisions
**? father requirement or proceeding regarding the estabSection
^ e n t of paternity.
, \
voluntary declaration of paternity may be com- 78-45f-100.
Title.
**** and signed any time after the birth of the child. A 78-45f-101.
Definitions.
untary declaration of paternity may not be executed or filed 78-45f-102.
Tribunal of state.
consen
t to or relinquishment for adoption has been 78-45f-103.
Remedies cumulative.
CHILD SUPPORT COLLECTION [REPEALED]

The voluntary declaration of paternity shall become an
r*rufi n t t o ^ ^S" 11 * 1 b i r t h certificate. The original
^ t i n 0 ^ an<^ *ke declaration s n a u < ^ marked so as to be
• u i ^ ? 1 1 8 ^ ^ ' ' r n e declaration may be included as part of
^ jequently issued certified copies of the birth certificate.
atively, electronically issued copies of a certificate may

Part 2
Jurisdiction
78-45f-201.
78-45f-202.

Bases for jurisdiction over nonresident.
Procedure when exercising jurisdiction over
nonresident.

78-45M00
Section
78-45f-203.
78-45f-204.
78-45f-205.
78-45f-206.
78-45f-207.
78-45f-208.
78-45f-209.

JUDICIAL CODE
Initiating and responding tribunal of state.
Simultaneous proceedings in another state.
Continuing, exclusive jurisdiction.
Enforcement and modification of support order
by tribunal having continuing jurisdiction.
Recognition of controlling child support order.
Multiple child support orders for two or more
obligees.
Credit for payments.
Part 3

Section
78-45f-609.
78-45f-610.
78-45f-611.
78-45f-612.
78-45f-613.
78-45f-614.

78-45f-313.
78-45f-314.
78-45f-315.
78-45f-316.
78-45f-317.
78-45f-318.
78-45f-319.

Proceedings under chapter.
Action by minor parent.
Application of law of state.
Duties of initiating tribunal.
Duties and powers of responding tribunal.
Inappropriate tribunal.
Duties of support enforcement agency.
Duty of attorney general.
Private counsel.
Duties of state information agency.
Pleadings and accompanying documents.
Nondisclosure of information in exceptional
circumstances.
Costs and fees.
Limited immunity of petitioner.
Nonparentage as defense.
Special rules of evidence and procedure.
Communications between tribunals.
Assistance with discovery.
Receipt and disbursement of payments.
Part 4
Establishment of Support Order

78-45f-401.

Petition to establish support order.
Parts

Enforcement of Order of Another State Without
Registration
78-45f-501.
78-45f-502.
78-45f-503.
78-45f-504.
78-45f-505.
78-45f-506.
78-45f-507.

Employer's receipt of income-withholding order of another state.
Employer's compliance with income withholding of another state.
Compliance with multiple income withholding
orders.
Immunity from civil liability.
Penalties for noncompliance.
Contest by obligor.
Administrative enforcement of orders.
Part 6

Enforcement and Modification of Support Order After
Registration
78-45f-601.
78-45f-602.
78-45f-603.
78-45f-604.
78-45f-605.
78-45f-606.
78-45f-607.
78-45f-608.

Registration of order for enforcement.
Procedure to register order for enforcement.
Effect of registration for enforcement.
Choice of law.
Notice of registration of order.
Procedure to contest validity or enforcement of
registered order.
Contest of registration or enforcement.
Confirmed order.

Notice to issuing tribunal of modification h
Part 7

Civil Provisions of General Application
78-45f-301.
78-45f-302.
78-45f-303.
78-45f-304.
78-45f-305.
78-45f-306.
78-45f-307.
78-45f-308.
78-45f-309.
78-45f-310.
78-45f-311.
78-45f-312.

Procedure to register child support d*^
another state for modification. ' ^ A J V *
Effect of registration for modification^liu
Modification of child support order of ajvstate.
^
Recognition of order modified in another ^
Jurisdiction to modify child support o^^u
another state when individual parties j S
f
in this state.
^^

Determination of Parentage
78-45f-701.

Proceeding to determine parentage.
Part 8

78-45f-801.
78-45f-802.

Interstate Rendition
Grounds for rendition.
Conditions of rendition.
Part 9
Miscellaneous Provisions

78-45f-901.

Uniformity of application and construction
PARTI
GENERAL PROVISIONS

78-45M00. Title.
This chapter is known as the "Uniform Interstaf -> Family
Support Act."
78-45M01. Definitions.
In this chapter:
(1) "Child" means an individual, whether over or under
the age of majority, who is or is alleged to be owed a duty
of support by the individual's parent or who is or is alleged
to be the beneficiary of a support order directed to the
parent.
(2) "Child support order* means a support order for a
child, including a child who has attained the age of
majority under the law of the issuing state.
(3) "Duty of support" means an obligation imposed or
imposable by law to provide support for a child, spouse, or
former spouse, including an unsatisfied obligation to
provide support.
(4) "Home state" means the state in which a child lived
with a parent or a person acting as parent for at least six
consecutive months immediately preceding the time of
filing of a petition or comparable pleading for support and,
if a child is less than six months old, the state in which the
child lived from birth with any of them. A period of
temporary absence of any of them is counted as part of the
six-month or other period.
(5) "Income" includes earnings or other periodic entitlements to money from any source and any other property
subject to withholding for support under the law of this
state.
(6) "Income-withholding order" means an order or notice directed to an obligor's employer directing the employer to withhold support from the income of the obligoi
in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11, Part 4 or Part 5
(7) "Initiating state" means a state from which a proceeding is forwarded or in which a proceeding is filed for
forwarding to a responding state under this chapter or a
law or procedure substantially similar to this chapter, the
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• form Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, or the
o Msed Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act.
A) "Initiating tribunal" means the authorized tribunal
an initiating state.
( 9) "Issuing state" m e a n s the state in which a tribunal
- ues a support order or renders a judgment determining
parentage.
(10) "Issuing tribunal" means the tribunal t h a t issues a
. u pport order or renders a judgment determining parent(11) "Law" includes decisional and statutory law and
rules and regulations having the force of law.
(12) "Obligee" means:
(a) an individual to whom a duty of support is or is
alleged to be owed or in whose favor a support order
has been issued or a judgment determining parentage has been rendered;
(b) a state or political subdivision to which the
rights under a duty of support or support order have
been assigned or which h a s independent claims based
on financial assistance provided to an individual
obligee; or
(c) an individual seeking a judgment determining
parentage of the individual's child.
(13) "Obligor" m e a n s an individual, or the estate of a
decedent who:
(a) owes or is alleged to owe a duty of support;
(b) is alleged but h a s not been adjudicated to be a
parent of a child; or
(c) is liable u n d e r a support order.
(14) "Register" means to file a support order or judgment deterniining parentage in the district court.
(15) "Registering tribunal" means a tribunal in which a
support order is registered.
(16) "Responding state" means a state in which a
proceeding is filed or to which a proceeding is forwarded
for filing from a n initiating state under this chapter or a
law or procedure substantially similar to this chapter, the
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, or the
Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act.
(17) "Responding tribunal" means the authorized tribunal in a responding state.
(18) "Spousal-support order" means a support order for
a spouse or former spouse of the obligor.
(19) "State" m e a n s a state of the United States, the
District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the United States
Virgin Islands, or any territory or insular possession
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. The term
includes an Indian tribe and a foreign jurisdiction t h a t
has enacted a law or established procedures for issuance
and enforcement of support orders which are substantially similar to the procedures under this chapter.
(20) "Support enforcement agency" means a public official or agency authorized to seek:
(a) enforcement of support orders or laws relating
to the duty of support;
(b) establishment or modification of child support;
(c) determination of parentage; or
(d) to locate obligors or their assets.
(21) "Support order" means a judgment, decree, or
order, whether temporary, final, or subject to modification,
for the benefit of a child, a spouse, or a former spouse,
which provides for monetary support, health care,
arrearages, or reimbursement, and may include related
costs and fees, interest, income withholding, attorney's
fees, and other relief.
(22) "Tribunal" means a court, administrative agency,
or quasi-judicial entity a u t h o r e d to establish, enforce, or
modify support orders or to determine parentage.
1997

78-45f-204

78-45M02. Tribunal of s t a t e .
The district court and the Department of H u m a n Services
are the tribunals of this state.
1997
78-45M03. R e m e d i e s c u m u l a t i v e .
Remedies provided by this chapter are cumulative and do
not affect t h e availability of remedies under other law.
1997
PART 2
JURISDICTION
78-45f-201. B a s e s for j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r n o n r e s i d e n t .
In a proceeding to establish, enforce, or modify a support
order or to determine parentage, a tribunal of this state may
exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident individual, or
the individual's guardian or conservator, if:
(1) the individual is personally served with notice
within this state;
(2) the individual submits to the jurisdiction of this
state by consent, by entering a general appearance, or by
filing a responsive document having the effect of waiving
any contest to personal jurisdiction;
(3) the individual resided with the child in this state;
(4) the individual resided in this state and provided
prenatal expenses or support for the child;
(5) the child resides in this state as a result of the acts
or directives of the individual;
(6) the individual engaged in sexual intercourse in this
state and the child may have been conceived by t h a t act of
intercourse;
(7) the individual asserted parentage in the putative
father registry maintained in this state by t h e state
registrar of vital records in the Department of Health
p u r s u a n t to Title 78, Chapter 30, Adoption; or
(8) there is any other basis consistent with the constitutions of this state and the United States for the exercise
of personal jurisdiction.
1997
78-45f-202. P r o c e d u r e w h e n e x e r c i s i n g j u r i s d i c t i o n
over nonresident.
A tribunal of this state exercising personal jurisdiction over
a nonresident under Section 78-45f-201 may apply Section
78-45f-316 to receive evidence from another state, and Section
78-45-318 to obtain discovery through a tribunal of another
state. In all other respects, P a r t s 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 do not apply
and the tribunal shall apply the procedural and substantive
law of this state, including the rules on choice of law other
t h a n those established by this chapter.
1997
78-45f-203. Initiating a n d r e s p o n d i n g tribunal of s t a t e .
Under this chapter, a tribunal of this state may serve as an
initiating tribunal to forward proceedings to another state and
as a responding tribunal for proceedings initiated in another
state.
1997

78-45f-204. Simultaneous
state.

proceedings

in

another

( D A tribunal of this state may exercise jurisdiction to
establish a support order if the petition is filed after a petition
or comparable pleading is filed in another state only:
(a) if the petition in this state is filed before the
expiration of t h e time allowed in the other state for filing
a responsive pleading challenging the exercise of jurisdiction by the other state;
(b) if the contesting party timely challenges the exercise of jurisdiction in the other state; and
(c) if relevant, this state is the home state of t h e child.
(2) A tribunal of this state may not exercise jurisdiction to
establish a support order if the petition is filed before a
petition or comparable pleading is filed in another state:
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(a) if the petition or comparable pleading in the other
state is filed before the expiration of the time allowed in
this state for filing a responsive pleading challenging the
exercise of jurisdiction by this state;
(b) if the contesting party timely challenges the exercise of jurisdiction in this state; and
(c) if relevant, the other state is the home state of the
child.
1997
78-45f-205. Continuing, exclusive jurisdiction.
(1) A tribunal of this state issuing a support order consistent with the law of this state has continuing, exclusive
jurisdiction over a child support order:
(a) as long as this state remains the residence of the
obligor, the individual obligee, or the child for whose
benefit the support order is issued; or
(b) until all of the parties who are individuals have
filed written consents with the tribunal of this state for a
tribunal of another state to modify the order and assume
continuing, exclusive jurisdiction.
(2) A tribunal of this state issuing a child support order
consistent with the law of this state may not exercise its
continuing jurisdiction to modify the order if the order has
been modified by a tribunal of another state pursuant to a law
substantially similar to this chapter.
(3) If a child support order of this state is modified by a
tribunal of another state pursuant to a law substantially
similar to this chapter, a tribunal of this state loses its
continuing, exclusive jurisdiction with regard to prospective
enforcement of the order issued in this state, and may only:
(a) enforce the order that was modified as to amounts
accruing before the modification;
(b) enforce nonmodifiable aspects of that order; and
(c) provide other appropriate relief for violations of that
order which occurred before the effective date of the
modification.
(4) A tribunal of this state shall recognize the continuing,
exclusive jurisdiction of a tribunal of another state which has
issued a child support order pursuant to a law substantially
similar to this chapter.
(5) A temporary support order issued ex parte or pending
resolution of a jurisdictional conflict does not create continuing, exclusive jurisdiction in the issuing tribunal.
(6) A tribunal of this state issuing a support order consistent with the law of this state has continuing, exclusive
jurisdiction over a spousal support order throughout the
existence of the support obligation. A tribunal of this state
may not modify a spousal support order issued by a tribunal of
another state having continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over
that order under the law of that state.
1997
78-45f-206. Enforcement and modification of support
order by tribunal having continuing jurisdiction.
(1) A tribunal of this state may serve as an initiating
tribunal to request a tribunal of another state to enforce or
modify a support order issued in that state.
(2) A tribunal of this state having continuing, exclusive
jurisdiction over a support order may act as a responding
tribunal to enforce or modify the order. If a party subject to the
continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of the tribunal no longer
resides in the issuing state, in subsequent proceedings the
tribunal may apply Section 78-45f-316 to receive evidence
from another state and Section 78-45f-318 to obtain discovery
through a tribunal of another state.
(3) A tribunal of this state which lacks continuing, exclusive
jurisdiction over a spousal support order may not serve as a
responding tribunal to modify a spousal support order of
another state.
1997
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78-45f-207. Recognition of controlling child support
order.
(1) If a proceeding is brought under this chapter and onlj
one tribunal has issued a child support order, the order of that
tribunal controls and must be so recognized.
(2) If a proceeding is brought under this chapter, and two 01
more child support orders have been issued by tribunals <tf
this state or another state with regard to the same obligor and
child, a tribunal of this state shall apply the following rules in
determining which order to recognize for purposes of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction:
(a) If only one of the tribunals would have continuing"
exclusive jurisdiction under this chapter, the order of that
tribunal controls and must be so recognized.
(b) If more than one of the tribunals would have
continuing, exclusive jurisdiction under this chapter, an
order issued by a tribunal in the current home state of the
child controls and must be so recognized, but if an order
has not been issued in the current home state of the child,
the order most recently issued controls and must be so
recognized.
(c) If none of the tribunals would have continuing,
exclusive jurisdiction under this chapter, the tribunal of
this state having jurisdiction over the parties shall issue
a child support order, which controls and must be so
recognized.
(3) If two or more child support orders have been issued for
the same obligor and child and if the obligor or the individual
obligee resides in this state, a party may request a tribunal oi
this state to determine which order controls and must be so
recognized under Subsection (2). The request must be accompanied by a certified copy of every support order in effect. The
requesting party shall give notice of the request to each party
whose rights may be affected by the determination.
(4) The tribunal that issued the controlling order under
Subsection (1), (2), or (3) is the tribunal that has continuing,
exclusive jurisdiction under Section 78-45f-205.
(5) A tribunal of this state which determines by order the
identity of the controlling order under Subsection (2)(a) or (b)
or which issues a new controlling order under Subsection (2)(c)
shall state in that order the basis upon which the tribunal
made its determination.
(6) Within 30 days after issuance of an order determining
the identity of the controlling order, the party obtaining the
order shall file a certified copy of it with each tribunal that
issued or registered an earlier order of child support. A part}/
who obtains the order and fails to file a certified copy is subject
to appropriate sanctions by a tribunal in which the issue oi
failure to file arises. The failure to file does not affect the
validity or enforceability of the controlling order.
1997
78-45f-208. Multiple child support orders for two or
more obligees.
In responding to multiple registrations or petitions fox
enforcement of two or more child support orders in effect at
the same time with regard to the same obligor and different
individual obligees, at least one of which was issued by a
tribunal of another state, a tribunal of this state shall enforce
those orders in the same manner as if the multiple orders had
been issued by a tribunal of this state.
IWI
78-45f-209. Credit for payments.
Amounts collected and credited for a particular period
pursuant to a support order issued by a tribunal of anothei
state must be credited against the amounts accruing 01
accrued for the same period under a support order issued bj
the tribunal of this state.
199*3

PART 3
CIVIL PROVISIONS OF GENERAL APPLICATION
7g45f-301.

Proceedings under chapter.

(1) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, this part
0 j j e s to all proceedings under this chapter.
(2) T^s c n a P t e r provides for the following proceedings:
(a) establishment of an order for spousal support or
child support p u r s u a n t to P a r t 4;

(b) enforcement of a support order and income-withholding order of another state without registration pursuant to Part 5;
(c) registration of an order for spousal support or child
support of another state for enforcement pursuant to P a r t
6;
(d) modification of an order for child support or spousal
support issued by a tribunal of this state pursuant to
Sections 78-45f-203, 78-45f-204, 78-45f-205, and 78-45f206;
(e) registration of an order for child support of another
state for modification pursuant to P a r t 6;
(f) determination of parentage p u r s u a n t to Part 7; and
(g) assertion ofjurisdiction over nonresidents pursuant
to Sections 78-45f-201 and 78-45f-202.
(3) An individual petitioner or a support enforcement
agency may commence a proceeding authorized under this
chapter by filing a petition in an initiating tribunal for
forwarding to a responding tribunal or by filing a petition or a
comparable pleading directly in a tribunal of another state
which has or can obtain personal jurisdiction over the respondent.
1W7
78-45f-302. A c t i o n b y m i n o r p a r e n t .
A minor parent, or a guardian or other legal representative
of a minor parent, may maintain a proceeding on behalf of or
for the benefit of the minor's child.
1997
78-45f-303. A p p l i c a t i o n of l a w of s t a t e .
Except as otherwise provided by this chapter, a responding
tribunal of this state shall:
(1) apply the procedural and substantive law, including
the rules on choice of law, generally applicable to similar
proceedings originating in this state and may exercise all
powers and provide all remedies available in those proceedings; and
(2) determine t h e duty of support and the amount
payable in accordance with the law and support guidelines of this state.
1997
78-45f-304. D u t i e s of i n i t i a t i n g tribunal.
(1) Upon the filing of a petition authorized by this chapter,
an initiating tribunal of this state shall forward three copies of
the petition and its accompanying documents:
(a) to the responding tribunal or appropriate support
enforcement agency in the responding state; or
(b) if the identity of the responding tribunal is unknown, to the state information agency of the responding
state with a request t h a t they be forwarded to the
appropriate tribunal and t h a t receipt be acknowledged.
(2) If a responding state has not enacted this chapter or a
law or procedure substantially similar to this chapter, a
tribunal of this state may issue a certificate or other document
and make findings required by the law of the responding state.
If the responding state is a foreign jurisdiction, the tribunal
may specify the amount of support sought and provide the
other documents necessary to satisfy the requirements of the
responding state.
1997
78-45f-305. D u t i e s a n d p o w e r s of r e s p o n d i n g tribunal*
(1) When a responding tribunal of this state receives a
Petition or comparable pleading from an initiating tribunal or

directly pursuant to Subsection 78-45f-301(2)(c), it shall cause
the petition or pleading to be filed and notify the petitioner
where and when it was filed.
(2) A responding tribunal of this state, to the extent otherwise authorized by law, may do one or more of the following:
(a) issue or enforce a support order, modify a child
support order, or render a judgment to determine parentage;
(b) order an obligor to comply with a support order,
specifying the amount and the manner of compliance;
(c) order income withholding;
(d) determine the amount of any arrearages and
specify a method of payment;
(e) enforce orders by civil or criminal contempt, or both;
(f) set aside property for satisfaction of the support
order;
(g) place liens and order execution on the obligor's
property;
(h) order an obligor to keep the tribunal informed of the
obligor's current residential address, telephone number,
employer, address of employment, and telephone number
a t the place of employment;
(i) issue a bench w a r r a n t for an obligor who has failed
after proper notice to appear at a hearing ordered by the
tribunal and enter the bench w a r r a n t in any local and
state computer systems for criminal warrants;
(j) order the obligor to seek appropriate employment by
specified methods;
(k) award reasonable attorneys' fees and other fees and
costs; and
(1) grant any other available remedy.
(3) A responding tribunal of this state shall include in a
support order issued under this chapter, or in the documents
accompanying the order, the calculations on which the support
order is based.
(4) A responding tribunal of this state may not condition t h e
payment of a support order issued under this chapter upon
compliance by a party with provisions for visitation.
(5) If a responding tribunal of this state issues an order
under this chapter, t h e tribunal shall send a copy of the order
to the petitioner and the respondent and to the initiating
tribunal, if any.
1997
78-45f-306.

I n a p p r o p r i a t e tribunal.

If a petition or comparable pleading is received by an
inappropriate tribunal of this state, it shall forward the
pleading and accompanying documents to an appropriate
tribunal in this state or another state and notify the petitioner
where and when the pleading was sent.
1997
78-45f-307. Duties of support enforcement agency.
(1) A support enforcement agency of this state, upon request, shall provide services to a petitioner in a proceeding
under this chapter.
(2) A support enforcement agency that is providing services
to the petitioner as appropriate shall:
(a) take all steps necessary to enable an appropriate
tribunal in this state or another state to obtain jurisdiction over the respondent;
(b) request an appropriate tribunal to set a date, time,
and place for a hearing;
(c) make a reasonable effort to obtain all relevant
information, including information as to income and property of the parties;
(d) within ten days, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays,
and legal holidays, after receipt of a written notice from
an initiating, responding, or registering tribunal, send a
copy of the notice to the petitioner;
(e) within ten days, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays,
and legal holidays, after receipt of a written communica-

tion from the respondent or t h e respondent's attorney,
Send a copy of the communication to t h e petitioner; and
(f) notify t h e petitioner if jurisdiction over t h e respondent cannot be obtained.
'*) This chapter does not create or negate a relationship of
attorney and client or other fiduciary relationship between a
su
P P o r t enforcement agency or the attorney for t h e agency
an
" the individual being assisted by the agency.
1997
r&L4$gtf0& Duty of attorney general.
" % e attorney general determines t h a t the support enforcement agency is neglecting or refusing to provide services to an
mcuv
i d u a l , the attorney general may order the agency to
p e r f o ^ jf£ duties under this chapter or m a y provide those
servi C e s directly to the individual.
1997
78-4

$f-309. Private counsel.
^7* individual may employ private counsel to represent the
individual in proceedings authorized by this chapter.
1997
78-4§f_3iQ # D u t i e s of state information agency.
d' The Office of Recovery Services is t h e state information
agency under this chapter.
'2) The state information agency shall:
(a) compile and maintain a current list, including addresses, of the tribunals in this state which have jurisdiction under this chapter and any support enforcement
Agencies in this state and transmit a copy to the state
information agency of every other state;
(b) maintain a register of tribunals and support enforcement agencies received from other states;
(c) forward to the appropriate tribunal in the place in
this state in which the individual obligee or the obligor
besides, or in which the obligor's property is believed to be
located, all documents concerning a proceeding under this
chapter received from an initiating tjibnna) DT the state
^formation agency of the initiating state; and
(d) obtain information concerning the location of the
%ligor and the obligor's property within this state not
Exempt from execution, by such means as postal verification and federal or state locator services, examination of
telephone directories, requests for the obligor's address
^om employers, and examination of governmental
*ecords, including, to the extent not prohibited by law,
%ose relating to real property, vital records, law enforcement, taxation, motor vehicles, driver's licenses, and
Social Security number.
1997

sonably put at risk by the disclosure of identifying infonna
t10n> or if an existing order so provides, a tribunal shall ordei
^ a t the address of the child or party or other identifyin|
" " O r a t i o n not be disclosed in a pleading or other document
*"ec* in a proceeding under this chapter.
199^
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-4&f-313. Costs and fees.
(1) The petitioner may not be required to pay a filing fee 01
other c o s t s
^ If an obligee ptevails, a responding tribunal may assess
^ ^ s t an obligor filing fees, reasonable attorneys' fees, other
p 0 8 ^, and necessary travel and other reasonable expenses
mcu
*red by the obligee and the obUgee's witnesses. The
t r i b u ^ m a v n o j . assess fees, costs,, or expenses against the
?DU£ee or the support enforcement agency of either the
" ^ ^ t i n g or the responding state, except as provided by law.
A tt0
; *ney's fees may be taxed as costs, and may be ordered paid
a rec
^ tly to the attorney, who may enforce the order in the
atto
*tiey's own name. Payment of support owed to the obligee
nas
Priority over fees, costs, and expenses.
(«*) The tribunal shall order the payment of costs and
reas
Qnable attorneys' fees if it determines that a hearing was
re( u
l Ssted primarily for delay. In a proceeding under Part 6 a
hear^g j s p r e s u m e d to have been requested primarily for
delay $ a registered support order is confirmed or enforced
without change.
1997
W4$f-314. Limited i m m u n i t y of petitioner.
d' Participation by a petitioner in a proceeding before a
responding tribunal, whether in person, by private attorney,
or
through services provided by the support enforcement
a eT
^ ^yi does not confer personal jurisdiction over the petition^j. m another proceeding.
'
'7) A petitioner is not amenable to service of civil process*
whil^ physically present in this state to participate in a
^^eding
under this chapter.
(3) Tn e immunity granted by this section does not extend to
° ™ Utigation based on acts unrelated to a proceeding under
" ^ Chapter committed by a party while present in this state
to
P a Hicipate in the proceeding.
199*
78-4§f_3i5 # N o n p a r e n t a g e a s defense.
A fearty whose parentage of a child h a s been previously
detei^njngd by o r pursuant to law may not plead nonparentage
88 a
defense to a proceeding under this chapter.
1997

78~4^f-316. Special rules of e v i d e n c e a n d procedure.
y ^ The physical presence of the petitioner in a responding
Pleadings and accompanying documents.
t r i b ^ a l of this state is not required for t h e establishment,
J^-' A petitioner seeking to establish or modify a support e n f° r cement, o r modification of a support order or the rendiorde* o r to determine parentage in a proceeding under this tion ^f a judgment determining parentage.
"k
cna
Pter must verify the petition. Unless otherwise ordered
(2)
A
verified
petition,
affidavit,
or
document
substantially
un e
" ^ Section 78-45f-312, the petition or accompanying docu- c 9gglying with federally mandated forms, and a document
m n
® ^5 must provide, so far as known, the name, residential igEPj^orated by reference in any of Jthem, not excluded under
address, and Social Security numbers of the obligor and the *7 e ^ a r s a y rule it given in personTis admissible in evidence, if r
ophg^e g ^ fae n a m e > sex ^ residential address, Social Secu- S l v e ^ under oath by a party or witness residing in another
—
f"y dumber, and date of birth of each child for whom support state^
18 so
ught. The petition must be accompanied by a certified
(*'
A
copy
of
the
record
of
child
support
payments
certified
C0 V
P of any support order in effect. The petition may include a s a true copy of the original by the custodian of the record
f1^ ^ther information that may assist in locating or identify- m a y be forwarded to a responding tribunal. The copy is
" ^ \e respondent.
^ " ^ n c e of facts asserted in it and is admissible to show,
'7' The petition must specify the relief sought. The petition w n e % e r payments were made.
^ d Accompanying documents must conform substantially
*J' Copies of bills for testing for parentage, and for prenatal
Y1^ the requirements imposed by the forms mandated by a n ° Postnatal health care of the mother and child, furnished
federy j a w for u s e m c a ses filed by a support enforcement
*° . e adverse party at least ten days before trial, are
aa m
agency
^ *ssible in evidence to prove the amount of the charges
1W7
billed ^ d that the charges were reasonable, necessary, and*
W4Af-312. Nondisclosure of information in excep- ^ t o m a r y .
tional circumstances.
(5> Documentary evidence transmitted from another state
a finding, which may be made ex parte, that the *° a Tribunal of this state by telephone, telecopier, or other
healt^ safety, or liberty of a party or child would be unrea- m e a n s that do not provide an original writing may not be.

excluded from evidence on an objection based on the means of
transmission.
(6) In a proceeding under this chapter, a tribunal of this
state may permit a party or witness residing in another state
to be deposed or to testify by telephone, audiovisual means, or
other electronic means at a designated tribunal or other
location in that state. A tribunal of this state shall cooperate
with tribunals of other states in designating an appropriate
location for the deposition or testimony.
(7) If a party called to testify at a civil hearing refuses to
answer on the ground that the testimony may be self-incriminating, the trier of fact may draw an adverse inference from
the refusal.
(8) A privilege against disclosure of communications between spouses does not apply in a proceeding under this
chapter.
(9) The defense of immunity based on the relationship of
husband and wife or parent and child does not apply in a
proceeding under this chapter.
1997
78-45f-317. C o m m u n i c a t i o n s b e t w e e n t r i b u n a l s .
A tribunal of this state may communicate with a tribunal of
another state in writing, or by telephone or other means, to
obtain information concerning t h e laws of t h a t state, t h e legal
effect of a judgment, decree, or order of t h a t tribunal, and t h e
status of a proceeding in the other state. A tribunal of this
state may furnish similar information by similar m e a n s to a
tribunal of another state.
1997
78-45f-318. A s s i s t a n c e w i t h discovery.
A tribunal of this s t a t e may:

(1) request a tribunal of another state to assist in
obtaining discovery; and
(2) upon request, compel a person over whom it h a s
jurisdiction to respond to a discovery order issued by a
tribunal of another state.
1997
78-45f-319. R e c e i p t a n d d i s b u r s e m e n t of p a y m e n t s .
A support enforcement agency or tribunal of this state shall
disburse promptly any amounts received p u r s u a n t to a support order, as directed by the order. The agency or tribunal
shall furnish to a requesting party or tribunal of another state
a certified statement by the custodian of the record of the
amounts and dates of all payments received.
1997

PART 4
ESTABLISHMENT OF SUPPORT ORDER
78-45f-401. Petition to establish support order.
(1) If a support order entitled to recognition under this
chapter has not been issued, a responding tribunal of this
state may issue a support order if:
(a) the individual seeking the order resides in another
state; or
(b) the support enforcement agency seeking the order
is located in another state.
(2) The tribunal may issue a temporary child support order
if:
(a) the respondent has signed a verified statement
acknowledging parentage;
(b) the respondent has been determined by or pursuant
to law to be the parent; or
(c) there is other clear and convincing evidence that the
respondent is the child's parent.
(3) Upon finding, after notice a n d opportunity to be heard,
t h a t an obligor owes a duty of support, the tribunal shall issue
a support order directed to the obligor and may issue other
orders p u r s u a n t to Section 78-45f-305.
1997

PART 5
ENFORCEMENT OF ORDER OF ANOTHER STATE
WITHOUT REGISTRATION
78-45f-501. Employer's r e c e i p t of i n c o m e - w i t h h o l d i n g
o r d e r of a n o t h e r s t a t e .
An income-withholding order issued in another state may be
sent to the person or entity defined as the obligor's employer
under Title 62A, Chapter 11, P a r t 4, Income Withholding,
without first filing a petition or comparable pleading or
registering the order with a tribunal of this state.
1997
78-451-502. Employer's c o m p l i a n c e w i t h i n c o m e w i t h h o l d i n g of a n o t h e r s t a t e .

(1) Upon receipt of an income withholding order, the obligor's employer shall immediately provide a copy of the order to
the obligor.
(2) The employer shall treat an income withholding order
issued in another state which appears regular on its face as if
it had been issued by a tribunal of this state.
(3) Except as otherwise provided in Subsection (4) and
Section 78-45f-503, the employer shall withhold and distribute
the funds as directed in the withholding order by complying
with terms of the order which specify:
(a) the duration and amount of periodic payments of
current child support, stated as a sum certain;
(b) the person or agency designated to receive payments and the address to which the payments are to be
forwarded;
(c) medical support, whether in the form of periodic
cash payment, stated as a sum certain, or ordering the
obligor to provide health insurance coverage for the child
under a policy available through the obligor's employment;
(d) the amount of periodic payments of fees and costs
for a support enforcement agency, the issuing tribunal,
and the obligee's attorney, stated as sums certain; and
(e) the amount of periodic payments of arrearages and
interest on arrearages, stated as sums certain.
(4) An employer shall comply with the law of the state of the
obligor's principal place of employment for withholding from
income with respect to:
(a) the employer's fee for processing an income withholding order,
(b) the maximum amount permitted to be withheld
from the obligor's income; and
(c) the times within which the employer must implement the withholding order and forward the child support
payment.
1997
78-45f-503. Compliance w i t h m u l t i p l e i n c o m e w i t h holding orders.
If an obligor's employer receives multiple income withholding orders with respect to the earnings of the same obligor, the
employer satisfies the terms of the multiple orders if the
employer complies with the law of the state of the obligor's
principal place of employment to establish the priorities for
the withholding and allocating income withheld for multiple
child support obligees.
1997
78-45f-504. Immunity from c i v i l liability.
An employer who complies with an income withholding
order issued in another state in accordance with this part is
not subject to civil liability to an individual or agency with
regard to the employer's withholding of child support from the
obligor's income.
1997
78-45f-505. P e n a l t i e s for n o n c o m p l i a n c e .
An employer who willfully fails to comply with an income
withholding order issued by another state and received for

78-45f-506
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e n f 0 rcement is subject to the same penalties that may be
imppsed for noncompliance with an order issued by a tribunal
1997
0 f trjds state.

7g^5f-506. Contest by obligor.
(l) An obligor may contest the validity or enforcement of an
m c ( ? m e withholding order issued in another state and received
c ^ c t l y by an employer m this state in the same manner as if
the order had been issued by a tribunal of this state. Section
78-45f-604 applies to the contest.
$ ) The obligor shall give notice of the contest to:
(a) a support enforcement agency providing services to
the obligee;
(b) each employer that has directly received an income
withholding order; and
(c) the person or agency designated to receive payments in the income withholding order or if no person or
agency is designated, to the obligee.
1997
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together with one copy of the documents and information,
r e g^rdless of their form.
(3) A petition seeking a remedy that must be affirmatively
sought under law of this state may be filed at the same time as
the fequest for registration or later. The pleading must specify
t h a groumis for the remedy sought.
1997
7g_45f-603. Effect of registration for enforcement.
(j,) A support order or income-withholdmg order issued in
another state is registered when the order is filed in the
registering tribunal of this state.
($j) A registered order issued in another state is enforceable
m tJie same manner and is subject to the same procedures as
an <?rder issued by a tribunal of this state.
(#) Except as otherwise provided in this part, a tribunal oi
thig state shall recognize and enforce, but may not modify, a
registered order if the issuing tribunal had jurisdiction. 1991

7g^5f-604. Choice of law.
(j,) The law of the issuing state governs the nature, extent,
amount, and duration of current payments and other obligation 8 °f support and the payment of arrearages under the
ord*r$ ) In a proceeding for arrearages, the statute of limitation
under &e l a w s of this state or of the issuing state, whichever
is l<7nger> applies.
\Wi
7g^5f-605. Notice of registration of order.
(j,) When a support order or income-withholding ordei
lagged in another state is registered, the registering tribunal
shajl notify the nonregistering party. The notice must be
^ ^ m n a n i e d ov, a cony of the registered order and the documents and relevant information accompanying the order.
(£) The notice must inform the nonregistering party:
(a) that a registered order is enforceable as of the date
PART 6
of registration in the same manner as an order issued by
a tribunal of this state;
ENFORCEMENT AND MODIFICATION OF SUPPORT
(b) that a hearing to contest the validity or enforcement
ORDER AFTER REGISTRATION
of the registered order must be requested within 20 days
7g^45f-601. Registration of order for enforcement.
after notice;
p> support order or a n income-withholding order issued by a
(c) that failure to contest the validity or enforcement of
tribunal of another state may be registered in this state for
the registered order in a timely manner will result in
enforcement.
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confirmation of the order and enforcement of the order
and the alleged arrearages and precludes further contest
7g_45f-602. Procedure to register order for enforceof that order with respect to any matter that could have
ment.
been asserted; and
0) A support order or income-withholding order of another
(d) of the amount of any alleged arrearages.
s t a t e may be registered in this state by sending the following
($)
Upon
registration of an income-withholding order for
documents and information to the appropriate tribunal in this
enforcement, the registering tribunal shall notify the obligor's
stat e :
(a) a letter of transmittal to the tribunal requesting employer pursuant to Title 62A, Chapter 11, Part 4, Income
Withholding.
i*97
registration and enforcement;
(b) two copies, including one certified copy, of all orders 7g^45f-606. Procedure to contest validity or enforceto be registered, including any modification of an order;
ment of registered order.
(c) a sworn statement by the party seeking registration
(%) A nonregistering party seeking to contest the validity or
or a certified statement by the custodian of the records enforcement of a registered order in this state shall request a
showing the amount of any arrearage;
hea*111^ within 20 days after notice of the registration. The
(d) the name of the obligor and, if known:
pifegiBi«nng party may se&L *u> ^ata'tfe "frife Tfegratratfiisn, *u>
li) the obligor's address and Social Security num- no
a^ert any defense to an allegation of noncompliance with the
ber;
(ii) the name and address of the obligor's employer registered order, or to contest the remedies being sought or the
amount of any alleged arrearages pursuant to this section.
and any other source of income of the obligor; and
(i) If the nonregistering party fails to contest the validity or
(iii) a description and the location of property of
the obligor in this state not exempt from execution; enforcement of the registered order in a timely manner, the
order is confirmed by operation of law.
and
(3) If a nonregistering party requests a hearing to contest
(e) the name and address of the obligee and, if applicable, the agency or person to whom support payments the validity or enforcement of the registered order, the registering tribunal shall schedule the matter for hearing and give
are to be remitted.
(2) On receipt of a request for registration, the registering notice to the parties of the date, time, and place of the hearing.
1907
tribunal shall cause the order to be filed as a foreign judgment,

7g_^5f-507. Administrative enforcement of orders.
(\) A party seeking to enforce a support order or an income^ t p h o l d i n g order, or both, issued by a tribunal of another
gta^e may send the documents required for registering the
o r d l r to a support enforcement agency of this state.
(^) Upon receipt of the documents, the support enforcement
agency, without initially seeking to register the order, shall
con ^ider and, if appropriate, use any administrative procedure
authorized by the law of this state to enforce a support order
o r a n income-withholding order, or both. If the obligor does not
c o n i e s t administrative enforcement, the order need not be
registered. If the obligor contests the validity or administrat e enforcement of the order, the support enforcement agency
shaU a g i s t e r the order pursuant to this chapter.
1997

the issuing state is a foreign jurisdiction that has not
C o n t e s t of r e g i s t r a t i o n o r e n f o r c e m e n t .
enacted a law or established procedures substantially
(1) A party contesting the validity or enforcement of a
similar to the procedures under this chapter, the consent
egistered order or seeking to vacate the registration has the
otherwise required of an individual residing in this state
. ^1irden of proving one or more of the following defenses:
is not required for the tribunal to assume jurisdiction to
jZ^-^*^"(a) the issuing tribunal lacked personal jurisdiction
modify the child support order.
>f^
over the contesting party;
(2) Modification of a registered child support order is sub(b) the order was obtained by fraud;
(c) the order has been vacated, suspended, or modified ject to the same requirements, procedures, and defenses that
apiply to the modification of an order issued by a tribunal of
by a later order;
160 the issuing tribunal 'has stayed the order pending
s^me manner.
appeal;
(3) A tribunal of this state may not modify any aspect of a
(e) there is a defense under the law of this state to the c^ild support order that may not be modified under the law of
remedy sought;
t^e issuing state. If two or more tribunals have issued child
(f) full or partial payment has been made; or
support orders for the same obligor and child, the order that
(g) the statute of limitation under Section 78-45f-604 controls and must be so recognized under Section 78-45f-207
precludes enforcement of some or all of the arrearages.
establishes the aspects of the support order which are
(2) If a party presents evidence establishing a full or partial n<?nmodifiable.
^fense "under Subsection (1), g-tiibuiidl may BlaTelgbTcemegt
(4) On issuance of an order modifying a child support order
*^tEe registered order, continue the proceeding to permit issued in another state, a tribunal of this state becomes the
Production of additional relevant evidence, and issue other tribunal of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction.
1997
a/>propriate orders. An uncontested portion of the registered
^der may be enforced by all remedies available under the law 7#-45f-612. Recognition of order modified in another
state.
Q{ this state.
A tribunal of this state shall recognize a modification of its
(3) If the contesting party does not establish a defense
u^der Subsection (1) to the validity or enforcement of the earlier child support order by a tribunal of another state which
Q^der, the registering tribunal shall issue an order confirming assumed jurisdiction pursuant to a law substantially similar
1997 to this chapter and, upon request, except as otherwise prot ^e order.
vided in this chapter, shall:
70-45f-6O8. Confirmed order.
(1) enforce the order that was modified only as to
Confirmation of a registered order, whether by operation of
amounts accruing before the modification;
jaw or after notice and hearing, precludes further contest of
(2) enforce only nonmodifiable aspects of that order;
foe order with respect to any matter that could have been
(3) provide other appropriate relief only for violations
asserted at the time of registration.
1997
of that order which occurred before the effective date of
the modification; and
70-45f-6O9. Procedure to register child support order
(4) recognize the modifying order of the other state,
of another state for modvfrcatioYu
upon registration, for the purpose of enforcement.
1997
A party or support enforcement agency seeking to modify, or
to modify and enforce, a child support order issued in another 70-45f-613. Jurisdiction to modify child support order
state shall register that order in this state in the same manner
of another state when individual parties reprovided in Sections 78-45f-601, 78-45f-602, 78-45f-603, and
side in this state.
7#-45f-604 if the order has not been registered. A petition for
(1) If all of the parties who are individuals reside in this
modification may be filed at the same time as a request for state and the child does not reside in the issuing state, a
registration, or later. The pleading must specify the grounds tribunal of this state has jurisdiction to enforce and to modify
for modification.
1997 tfre issuing state's child support order in a proceeding to
register that order.
70-45f-61O. Effect of registration for modification.
(2) A tribunal of this state exercising jurisdiction under this
A tribunal of this state may enforce a child support order of section shall apply the provisions of P a r t s 1 and 2, this part,
another state registered for purposes of modification, in the afid the procedural and substantive law of this state to t h e
s #me manner as if the order had been issued by a tribunal of
proceeding for enforcement of modification. Parts 3, 4, 5, 7,
tljis state, but the registered order may be modified only if the
1997
requirements of Section 78-45f-611 have been met.
1997 a|id 8 do not apply.
7 A-45f-607.

7$-45f-611. Modification of child support order of another state.
(1) After a child support order issued in another state has
been registered in this state, the responding tribunal of this
state may modify that order only if Section 78-45f-613 does not
apply and after notice and hearing it finds that:
(a) the following requirements are met:
(i) the child, the individual obligee, and the obligor
do not reside in the issuing state;
(ii) a petitioner who is a nonresident of this state
(iii) the respondent is subject to the personal jurisdiction of the tribunal of this state; or
(b) the child, or a party who is an individual, is subject
to the personal jurisdiction of the tribunal of this state
and all of the parties who are individuals have filed
written consents in the issuing tribunal for a tribunal of
this state to modify the support order and assume continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the order. However, if

7#-45f-614. N o t i c e to i s s u i n g tribunal of modification.
Within 30 days after issuance of a modified child support
0 r der, the party obtaining the modification shall file a certified
copy of the order with the issuing tribunal that had continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the earlier order, and in each
tribunal in which the party knows the earlier order has been
registered. A party who obtains the order and fails to file a
certified copy is subject to appropriate sanctions by a tribunal
in which the issue of failure to file arises. The failure to file
does not affect the validity or enforceability of the modified
Q<der of the new tribunal h a v i n g c o n t i n u i n g exclusive jurisdiction.
1997
PART 7
DETERMINATION OF PARENTAGE
7#-45f-701. P r o c e e d i n g t o d e t e r m i n e parentage.
( D A tribunal of this state may serve as an initiating or
responding tribunal in a proceeding brought under this chap-

ter or £ law substantially similar to this chapter or the
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, to determine
that the petitioner is a parent of a particular child or to
determine that a respondent is a parent of that child.
(2) In a proceeding to determine parentage, a responding
tribunal of this state shall apply Title 78, Chapter 45a,
Uniform Act on Paternity, and the rules of this state on choice
oflaw.

1997

PAKTV
JUEOBS

CHAPTER 46
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section
78-46-1,

PARTS
INTERSTATE RENDITION
78-45f»0Ol. Grounds for rendition.
(1) For purposes of this part, "governor* includes an individual performing the functions of governor or the executive
authority of a state covered by this chapter.
(2) The governor of this state may:
(#) demand that the governor of another state surrender an individual found in the other state who is charged
criipinally in this state with having failed to provide for
the support of an obligee; or
(I)) on the demand by the governor of another state,
surrender an individual found in this state who is charged
criipinally in the other state with having failed to provide
for the support of an obligee.
(3) A provision for extradition of individuals not inconsistent with this chapter applies to the demand even if the
individual whose surrender is demanded was not in the
demanding state when the crime was allegedly committed and
has not fled therefrom.
1997

78-46-3,
78-46-4,
78-46-5,
78-46-6,
78-46-7,
78-46-8,
78-46-9,
78-46-10.
78-46*1*.
78-46-1?.

78-46-13.
78-46-14.
78-46-15.
78-46-16.

Short title.
J\3£<sra refected GSQSBLTO85&H&.cs<*«& ss&te&ii
Opportunity and obligation to serve.
Discrimination prohibited.
Definitions.
Trial by jury.
Repealed.
Persons competent to serve as jurors — r-ersons
not competent to serve as jurors.
Determination on juror qualification.
Repealed.
Master jury list — Inclusive — Review — Re^
newal — Public examination.
Repealed.
Qualified jury list—Term of availability—Juror
qualification form — Content — Completion —
Penalties for failure to complete or misrepresentation — Joint jury list for court authorized.
Repealed.
Qualified prospective jurors not exempt trom
jury service.
Excuse from jury service.
Jury not selected in conformity with chapter —
Procedure to challenge — Relief available —
Exclusive remedy.
Preservation of records.
Repeated.
Limitations on jury service.
Penalties for failure to appear or complete iurv
service.
Employer not to discharge or threaten employee
for jury service — Criminal penalty — Civil
action by employee.
78-46-23. Repealed.

78-45f-£02. C o n d i t i o n s of rendition.
(1) Before making demand that the governor of another
state &x>rrfcndeY an individual charged criminally in th&& state 78-46-17.
with having failed to provide for the support of an obligee, the 1fc-4fcAfc.
governor of this state may require a prosecutor of this state to 78-46-19.
demonstrate that at least 60 days previously the obligee had 78-46-20.
initiated proceedings for support pursuant to this chapter or
78-46-21^
that the proceeding would be of no avail.
(2) If* under this chapter or a law substantially similar to
this chapter or the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, the governor of another state makes a demand that 78-46-22,
the governor of this state surrender an individual charged
criminally in that state with having failed to provide for the 78-46-1- Short title.
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Jury7
support of a child or other individual to whom a duty of
1979 'a
support is owed, the governor may require a prosecutor to Selection and Service Act."
investigate the demand and report whether a proceeding for
r
support has been initiated or would be effective. If it appears 78-46-2' Jurors selected from random cross section —*
Opportunity
and
obligation
to
serve.
that a proceeding would be effective but has not been initiated,
It is the policy of this state that persons selected for jury
the governor may delay honoring the demand for a reasonable
service
be selected at random from a fair cross section of the
time to permit the initiation of a proceeding.
population of the county, and that all qualified citizens have
(3) If a proceeding for support has been initiated and the
the opportunity in accordance with this chapter to be considindividual whose rendition is demanded prevails, the governor
ered for service and have the obligation to serve when summay decline to honor the demand. If the petitioner prevails
moned for that purpose.
1993
and the individual whose rendition is demanded is subject to
a support order, the governor may decline to honor the 78-46-3* Discrimination prohibited.
demand if the individual is complying with the support order.
A citizen shall not be excluded or exempt from jury service
1997
on account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age,
occupation, disability, or economic status.
1992
PART 9
78-46-4. Definitions.
(1) "Clerk* or "clerk of the court" means the person so
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
designated by title and includes any deputy clerk.
(2) "Court" means trial courts.
78-45f'90L Uniformity of application and construc(3) "Jury* means a body of persons temporarily selected
tion.
This chapter shall be applied and construed to effectuate its from the citizens of a particular county invested with power to
general purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the present and indict a person for a public offense or to try a
subject of this chapter among states enacting it.
1997 question of fact.

